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I. INTRODUCTION

Another Haboob is kicking up dust in Iran though this time it is not the
meteorological phenomenon partly responsible for America's rescue
debacle of 1980.2 Rather, it is the winds of political change. For almost
two decades, global politics have locked U.S. energy investors out of the
Iranian market Now, with the spotlight on Iranian President Khatami's
reform movement, U.S. sanctions appear to be the only obstacle.' Despite
conservative crackdowns and political instability,5 Iran has reopened the
door to some of the world's most lucrative prospects for big oil

2. A Haboob is the Iranian name for a meteorological condition associated with a desert
thunderstorm belt. Downward air pressure from the storm will form a suspended cloud of dust up
to a hundred miles from the storm center. This phenomenon is a noted factor in the failure of U.S.
forces to rescue American hostages in Iran. See JAMES H. KYLE, THE GuTs TO TRY 178,248,249,
327(1990).
3. For background information on the evolution of U.S.-Iranian relations, see generally
JAMES A. BILL, THE EAGLE AND THE LION, THE TRAGEDY OF AMERICAN-IRANIAN RELATIONS

(1988).
4. The Iranian reform movement has been referred to as "Iran's Second Revolution." See,
e.g., Protestingin Tehran, ECONOMIST, July 17, 1999, at 39.

5. See id.
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businesses.' And, they want in.
In 1995 CONOCO representatives outbid competitors for the first
American-Iranian energy agreement since Washington severed relations
with Tehran in 1980.' This contract, estimated at a value of over $1 billion
in U.S. dollars (USD), served as a harbinger of future Iranian multi-million
dollar foreign direct investment offers.' Paradoxically, it shocked the
Clinton Administration. 9 Given Iran's pariah status as a state-sponsor of
terrorism,' the President of the United States quickly declared the
CONOCO's actions "inconsistent" with American foreign policy." Shortly
thereafter, both the executive and legislative branches tightened
prohibitions on Iranian business transactions.' 2 These strictures remain the
primary hurdle to entry into the Iranian market.
This Article reexamines Iranian sanctions. It takes a pragmatic
approach by combining an overview of the Iranian natural resource market
with analysis of the structure of sanctions and their legal impact on
Western energy investments. Although previous scholarship has touched
on the viability of unilateral sanctions under international law,' 3 few have
scrutinized the actual contract developments that have occurred since U.S.Iranian sanctions were implemented." In contrast, this Article serves to
benefit businessmen, lawyers, and policymakers alike by highlighting the

6. See generally Bahree I, supra note 1.
7. After three years of private negotiations, CONOCO outbid TOTAL SA for development of
Sirri gas fields. See Bahree I, supra note 1; see also CONOCO Signs Deal with Iran to Build Oilfield,
- Deal Made Despite Growing Support in Congress to Forbid all Economic and Financial
Transactionswith Iran, ORLANDO SENTINEL, Mar. 7, 1995, at A3.
8. See id.
9. See Robert H. Pelletreau, The United States, Iran and the TOTAL Deals, XX INT'L LAW.
NEWS. 23 (1998) (discussing Secretary of State Warren Christopher's anger at not having prior
knowledge of CONOCO'S deal with Iran).
10. See Robert S. Greenberger, Clinton AdministrationBlasts DUPONT'S CONOCO Unit Over
Oil Contract with Iran, WALL ST. J., Mar. 8, 1995, at A.5 (quoting U.S. White House and State

Department press releases: "This kind of cooperation with Iran is inconsistent with our policy of
bringing pressure on Iran, both politically and economically, to change its unacceptable behavior.").
11.

See id.

12. President Clinton tightened sanctions on Iran almost immediately after CONOCO
announced its agreement. The U.S. Congress followed up with its own legislation less than a year
later. See Exec. Order No. 12,957, 60 Fed. Reg. 14,615 (1995) [hereinafter Exec. Order No.
12,957]; see alsoThe Iran Libya Sanctions Act (ILSA) of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-172, 110 Stat. 541
(1996), reprintedin 50 U.S.C.A. § 1701 (West Supp. 1999) [hereinafter ILSA].
13. See, e.g., Richard G. Alexander, IranandLibyaSanctionsActofi996: CongressExceeds

its Jurisdictionto PrescribeLaw, 54 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 1601, 1603 (1997).
14. See generally John Elicott, Between a Rock and a Hard Place: How Multinational
CompaniesAddressConflicts Between U.S. SanctionsandForeignBlocking Measures,27 STETSON

L. REV. 1365 (1998) (failing to take a comprehensive approach to analyzing corporate sanctions
strategies).
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domestic political risk associated with sanctions. 5
Domestic political risk presents a difficult and unpredictable challenge
for energy companies seeking to enter uncertain markets. Though the risk
of sanctions enforcement may be difficult to quantify, it must be taken into
account in business transactions and contract provisions. Indeed, many of
today's multi-national corporations (MNC's) are utilizing groundbreaking
financial strategies in order to maintain a competitive edge in the Iranian
market. These strategies may not be openly discussed in business literature
or readily apparent in the news reports, but their careful evaluation
ultimately reveals the ineffectiveness of unilateral sanctions as a policy
tool.
II. CURRENT U.S. POSTURE TOWARDS INVESTMENT IN IRAN
"Washington's view of the Middle East is a distorted one
1916

The U.S. government has maintained a declared state-of-emergency
with Iran for over twenty years.' 7 Since November 4, 1979 when Iranian
students overran the U.S. embassy in Tehran, taking 63 American citizens
hostage in a crisis that lasted 444 days, America's primary response to a
declared emergency has been through economic sanctions." Even when
Iranian sanctions relief has appeared possible, further regional tensions
have sidetracked the normalization of relations.' 9 One crisis has followed

15. The local political operating environment has traditionally been the single most important
factor in a multi-national corporations foreign petroleum investment initiatives. See CHRISTOPHER
TUGENDHAT, OIL THE BIGGEST BUSINESS 176 (1,969).
16. Archie Dunham, Fulfilling the Promiseof Middle East Petroleum: A US. Perspective
(1998) (visited 2 Sept. 1999) <http://www.conoco.com> (recounting Archie W. Dunham, President
of CONOCO, statement that "Washington's view of the Middle East is a distorted one[,] an image
of a region where instability is the norm and political minefields place global oil supplies and
therefore global economic growth in continuous jeopardy.").
17. In response to the Iran-Hostage crisis, President Carter issued Exec. Order 12,170 on 14
Nov. 1979 blocking Iranian assets within United States jurisdiction. See Exec. Order No. 12,170,
44 Fed Reg. 65,729 (1979), reprintedin 50 U.S.C.A. 1701 [hereinafter Exec. OrderNo. 12,170].
18. Iranian students initially took 63 Americans hostage. Some were released prior to the
negotiated resolution of the crisis. As such, many authorities utilize different totals causing some
literary confusion. See KYLE, supra note 2, at 27; see also DANIEL YERGIN, THE PRIZE-THE EPIC
QUEST FOR OIL, MONEY AND POWER 699-702 (1991) (documenting the crisis).
19. After conclusion of the Iran-Hostage Crisis, Iranian sanctions were rescinded. President
Reagan later reinstated sanctions in response to the Iranian military threats against U.S.-Flagged
vessels supporting Operation EARNEST WILL during the Iran-Iraq War. Compare Exec. Order No.
12,525, (1985), reprintedin 50 U.S.C.A. § 1701 (West Supp., 1999) [hereinafter Exec. Order.No.
12,525], with Exec. Order No. 12,613, (1987), reprintedin 50 U.S.C.A. § 1701 (West Supp. 1999)
[hereinafter Exec. Order.No. 12,613].
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another, and the renewed import embargo established by the Reagan
Administration during the Iran-Iraq war has resulted in a regulatory system
that continues to have negative consequences for international businesses.
today.2"
The cornerstone of the modem day Iranian sanctions regime rests in
President Carter's Executive Order 12,170.21 Since its implementation the
United States has taken virtually no steps towards reestablishing economic
or diplomatic relations with Iran.22 Policymakers proffer a number of
reasons for maintaining a hard-line policy. 2" The most frequently cited
reasons are Iran's continued pursuit of weapons of mass destruction
(WMD) and its sponsorship of international terrorism. 24 On these bases,
the Clinton Administration has branded its policy in the region with the
term DUAL CONTAINMENT."
DUAL CONTAINMENT has its roots in policies from the Former Soviet
era.6 It is designed to contain potential Iranian and Iraqi aggression in
efforts similar to relations with the former U.S.S.R. The intended purpose
of this policy is to promote "stability and peaceful change" by handling
both Iran and Iraq as hostile states. Subsequently, this policy relies on
economic sanctions as a primary means of preventing Iran from acquiring

20. See Exec. Order No. 12,959, 60 Fed. Reg. 24,757 (1995) [hereinafter Exec. Order No.
12,959]; see also Exec. Order No. 13,059, 62 Fed Reg 44,531, reprinted in 50 U.S.C.A. § 1701,

(West Supp. 1999) [hereinafter Exec. OrderNo. 13,059] (outlining U.S.-Iranian sanctions policies,
clarifying President Clinton's initial Executive Order, and establishing present day sanctions
regime).
21. See Exec. Order. No. 12,170, supra note 17.
22. Cf id.
23. See Jesse Helms, What Sanctions Epidemic? US. Business' Curious Crusade, 78

2 (Jan./Feb. 1999) [hereinafter Helms].
24. Frequently cited reasons for a hard-line policy towards Iran include also its postulated
involvement in the breakdown of the Israeli-Palestinian Peace Accords, and its regional arms
FOREIGN AFFAIRS

buildup. See, e.g., WILLIAM J. CLINTON, Message to the Congress on the Continuation of the
National Emergency with Respect to Development ofIranian Petroleum Resources, Mar., 5, 1997,
in WILLIAM J. CLINTON, I PUB. PAPERS 240 (Jan. 1, 1997) [hereinafter PUBLic PAPERS 1997].
Experts allege, however, that it is only a matter of time before Iran is able to acquire nuclear
technology. See Michael Eisenstadt, Living with a Nuclear Iran?, 41 Survival 124 (1999)
(discussing Iran's pursuits for nuclear technology).
25. See Martin Indyk, Indyk Remarks at NY Council on Foreign Relations, Apr. 22, 1999
(visited 27 Apr. 1999) <http://www.usia.gov/regional/nea/mena/indyy0423.htr> (discussing DUAL
CONTAINMENT); see also OFFICE OF INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS, DEP'T OF DEFENSE,
UNITED STATES SECURITY STRATEGY FOR THE MIDDLE EAST 2 (1995) [hereinafter STRATEGY]
(clarifying U.S. strategy in the Middle East); Patrick Clawson, The Continuing Logic of DUAL
CONTAINMENT, 40 SURVIVAL 33 (1998) (describing the evolution of DUAL CONTAINMENT and
arguing that its use is the "better alternative").
26. See S.J. DEITCHMAN, BEYOND THE THAW: A NEW NATIONAL STRATEGY 44 (1991).
27. See STRATEGY, supra note 25, at 2.
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the financial resources necessary to sustain international aggression.28
Although the United States has repeatedly relied on sanctions since
Colonial times, 29 the effectiveness of today's unilateral sanctions is hotly
contested.3 °
Regardless of their overall effectiveness, sanctions have undoubtedly
taken a bite out of international petroleum investments. 3' They exist as
more than just a speed bump in business planning. Though vocal critics
and foreign legislation have lessened the sting, few U.S. citizens realize
the dramatic changes occurring in the Iranian market.32 Sanctions rhetoric
has had a strong impact on public perceptions and has overshadowed the
announcement by Iran's Foreign Minister Kamal Kharazi that the Iranian
government posits no obstacles to U.S. investments in Iran.33
III.

EMERGING IRANIAN INVESTMENT CLIMATE

"There is no obstacle to U.S. ' oil
34 companies participating in
development projects in Iran.
Iran plays a critical role as a resource base for the growing demand of
Middle Eastern energy supplies.35 It is the second largest oil producer
among Oil Producing Export Countries (OPEC) and it maintains the
second largest natural gas reserves'behind Russia.36 Though these factors
help contribute to the pressure lobbyists place on Capitol Hill, it is not
likely that sanctions will soon be lifted. Much like the past, political

28. See Exec. Order No. 12,613, supra note 19.
29. See Helms, supra note 23, at 4.
30. See, e.g., Joseph Marty et al., Symposium: US. GulfPolicy: How Can It Be Fixed?, VI
MIDDLE EAST POL'Y l(June 1998) (debating U.S. sanctions policies towards Iran).
31. Since CONOCO backed out ofits agreement with Iran, no other U.S. company has entered
into a major Iranian energy agreement. See Patrick Crow, U.S. Petroleum Firms Hit Hard by
Washington's UnilateralSanctions,95 OIL & GAS J.37 (1997); see also Iran-LibyaSanctions Act
1 Year Later, Hearingbefore the Committee on InternationalRelationsHouse of Representatives,
105th Cong. 75-79 (1997) [hereinafter House Hearings] (testimony of Jeffrey J. Schott).
32. In juxtaposition to contrasting perceptions regarding Iranian politics, lobbying groups
have been pressuring Congress hard for a change in U.S. sanctions policies. One of the largest and
most active trade-based lobbying group is USA*Engage. See, e.g., USA*ENGAGE Homepage
(visited Sept. 2, 1999) <http://www.usaengage.org/> (displaying sanctions related information);
compare New Intrigue Roils Iran, U.S. NEWS, Aug. 2, 1999, at 8 (displaying Reuters picture with
U.S. activist holding sign saying "Khatami is a Terrorist, down with Khatami").
33. See US. Firms Face "No Obstacle" to Iran Oil Industry, Agence France-Presse, Mar.

7, 1999, available in 1999 WL 2559432 [hereinafter No Obstacle].
34. Id.
35. See Andrew Rathnell, Iran's Liquid Lifeline, 7 JANE'S INTELLIGENCE REV. 411, 412
(1998); see also Crude Cuts: Will Oil Nations Stick or Stay, WALL ST.J., Mar. 26, 1999, at A19.
36. Rathnell, supra note 35, at 412.

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/fjil/vol12/iss2/3

6

INVESWENT
IRAN on Contemporary Energy Investm
McCary: End Run on Sanctions:
A CaseINStudy

difficulties plague present day Iranian energy investments."
Iranian religious and cultural differences have posed the primary
hurdles to international business investments since Englishman William
Knox D'Arcy won his concession from Shah Muzzafar al-Din in 1901.3"
With a cultural base uniquely distinct from its Arab neighbors,39 Iran
appears a strange and unfamiliar country for most Westerners.4 This
differing social structure has promulgated Iran's nationalist tendencies.4
It has also led to political misunderstandings, regional tensions, and a
historical suspicion of foreigners.42 The general perception in America is
that Iran is a hostile and closed market.4 3
Power struggles over Iran's geo-strategic location and its natural
resources further taint Iran's less-than-favorable market reputation."
European imperialism and Cold-War has led to Iranian mistrust for
Western governments. 45 This mistrust sparked two events that isolated Iran
from the world community: the Iranian nationalization of foreign oil assets
in 1951 and the Iranian Revolution of 1979.46 Since then, the Iranian

37. Although foreign investments have been historically threatened by foreign political crises,
present day investments are threatened more by domestic political risks. Recent initiatives to invest
in the Iranian market have been fraught with domestic political considerations. These are
manifested by the nature in which Iranian sanctions arose. President Clinton announced his Iranian
Sanctions policies prior to upcoming presidential elections in front of the World Jewish Congress.
This announcement came six days before official notification to Congress after lobbyists put
pressure on the administration to take action against investments in Iran. Incidentally, CONOCO is
a subsidiary of DuPONT, in which 25% ownership rested with active members of the World Jewish
Congress. Compare Kambiz Foroohar, Big Oil Versus Clinton, MIDDLE E., May 1, 1995, at 18
(alluding to the political nature of Iranian sanctions), with William J. Clinton, Remarks atthe World
Jewish Congress Dinner in New York City, Book I Pub. Papers 614-16 (Apr. 30, 1999) [hereinafter
Public Papers 1995], and PUBLIC PAPERS 1997, supra note 24, at 653-654.
of the Iranian country at 16% net
38. The terms of D'Arcy's original concession were:
annual profit in return for payment to the Shah in the amount of £20,000 and £20,000 worth of
shares in the stake. See YERGIN, supra note 18, at 135-149 (discussing a comprehensive history of
early concessions in Iran and the Middle East).
39. Iran's predominant Shia sect accounts for only 15% of the Muslim world. See JOHN
SABIN], ISLAM: A PRIMER 45(1983)(providing a basic value of the difference between Shia and
Sunni faith).
40. See YERGIN, supranote 18, at 138 (describing the clash between Shia andSunni Moslem
sects and its impact on foreign oil investments in Iran).
41. See id. at 139; see also Houman A. Sadri, An Islamic Perspective on Non-Alignment:
Iranian ForeignPolicy in Theory and Practice, 16 J. THIRD WORLD STUD. 2946 (1999).
42. See YERGIN, supra note 18, at 139.
43. See Dunham, supra note 16.
44. Compare YERG IN,supranote 18, at 135-49 (describing historical struggle between U.K.
and Russia for power in the Middle East), with DEITCHMAN, supra note 26, at 119 (describing
contemporary struggle for power in the Middle East).
45. Cf. DEITCHMAN, supranote 26, at 119.
46. See generally YERGIN, supra note 18.
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energy sector has been largely devoid of foreign investors.47
The geo-political situation appears different today. Though Iran
maintains a certain amount of apprehension regarding Western policies,
(particularly over measures such as recent U.S. executive and legislative
proposals to overthrow Iranian and Iraqi regimes)," present day Iran
reflects strong undercurrents of pluralism.49 In May 1997, 20 million of 30
million voters, most under the age of 30, elected a moderate to
office-President Mohammad Khatami.5" Considered to be an antiestablishment candidate, Khatami is forging new change."' He has placed
emphasis on promoting peace and stability through economic development
and social liberalization. 2
Under Khatami's leadership, Iran has expanded foreign investment
offers and created newfound political and economic ties with neighboring
States.5 3 Although a bulwark of religious fundamentalism remains, Iran's

47. Compare TUGENDHAT, supra note 15. with YERGIN, supra note 18.
48. See YERGIN, supra note 18, at 488-70. Much distrust lingers from the suspicion of U.S.'
involvement in covert operations. Iranians still have not forgotten CIA/M16 involvement in the
1953 toppling of Muhammed Mossadeq in Operation AJAX. Subsequently, both the Executive and
legislative branches continue to fuel this distrust with proposals and funding for covert operations
in the Middle East and continual military involvement abroad. See id. at 468-70; see also Charles
Kurzman, Soft on Satan: Challenges For Iranian-US. Relations, VI MIDDLE E. POL'Y 63 (Jun.
1998). Compare Milton Viorst, The Limits of the Revolution, 74 FOREIGN AFFAIRS 63, 65
(Nov./Dec., 1995) (describing lingering skepticism over previous U.S. covert involvement in Iran),
with John Diamond, Replacing Iran Regime Advocated by Gingrich, WASH. POST, Feb. 9, 1995,
at A24, and Associated Press, House Stealthily Approves $28 Billion Budget for Spy Activities,
ARIZ. REPUBLIC/PHOENIX GAZETTE, Dec. 22, 1995, at A8, (discussing Congressional allocation of
$20 million to be used in covert operations against Iran). See generally MARK BOWDEN, BLACK
HAWK DOWN-A STORY OF MODERN WAR 1999 (presenting the perception that even innocuous U.S.
involvement can escalate to more dubious military action); Alan Cooperman et al., Rolling Up in
Iraq Hussein Backs Down for the Moment, but a CIA OperationIs Destroyed;Northern Iraq,U.S.
NEWS, Sept. 23, 1996, at 50, 59-60, (alleging recent failure of covert operations in Northern Iraq);
Warren Strobel, America's Planto Get Saddam. Congress FundedIt. Now ClintonIs Fully Behind
It. But Will It Work?, U.S. NEWS, Nov. 30, 1998, (describing $97 million in funding for covert
operations under the Iraq Liberation Act); Johanna McGeary, Taking Out Saddam, TIME, Nov. 30,
1998, at 46 (providing further details on plans for U.S. covert action against Iraq); Protestorinto
Prisoner,Economist 44, Nov. 13, 1999 (reporting on Iran's present concerns over covert operations
and the recent secret execution of four student protestors for allegedly collaborating with western
intelligence services).
49. Stephen C. Fairbanks, A New Erafor Iran?,V MIDDLE EAST POL'Y 51, 55 (Sept. 1997).
50. See Jahangir Amuzegar, Khatami's Iran, One Year Later, VI MIDDLE EAST POL'Y 76,
77 (Oct. 1998).
51. See id. at 8l.
52. See id.
53. See id. at 88; see also R.K. Ramazani, The Emerging Arab-IranianRapprochement:
Towards an Integrated U.S. Policy in the Middle East?, VI MIDDLE EAST POL'Y 45 (JUNE 1998)
(discussing Iranian initiatives to build trust among its Gulf neighbors).
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social climate is changing dramatically.54 The most recent local council
elections of February 1999 reaffirm the popularity of Khatami's reforms. 55
The Iranian youth, removed from the revolution of a previous generation,
are seeking both economic and societal freedom.56
Like the majority of its Gulf State neighbors, Iran now faces a host of
modem economic problems." Rising population trends, declining oil
prices, increasing costs of urbanization, and an aging petroleum production
infrastructure are forcing these countries to slowly adopt more moderate
economic policies.5" At the top of their agenda is cautious privatization and
efforts to attract increased foreign direct investment. 59 These measures are
vital to stimulating competition and higher economic growth.6'
European and Asian governments recognize Iran's economic
importance.6 ' They have reconciled previous differences and responded
with cooperative if not amicable relations.62 Internal and external
economic forces are now pushing Iran towards increased interdependence
in globalized financial markets.63 Its role in recent OPEC cuts highlights
this fact.' As the emerging economic interdependence between Asia,
54. See Hamid Zangeneh, The Post-RevolutionaryIranianEconomy: A PolicyAppraisal,VI
MIDDLE EAST POL'Y 113, 114 (Oct. 1998) (noting that "just under half of the [Iranian] population
is 20 years old or younger, and is in need of education, vocational skills, and jobs").
55. See Geneive Abdo, ElectoralPolitics in Iran, VI MIDDLE EAST POL'Y 128 (June 1999).
56. See generally e.g., Viorst, supra note 48.
57. See Alan Richards, The Global FinancialCrisisand Economic Reform in the Middle
East, VI MIDDLE EASTPOL'Y 62,63,66 (Feb. 1999) (discussing rising population and urbanization
concerns among the Gulf States).
58. CompareJohn Page, The Impact of Lower Oil Prices on the Economies of Gulf States,
VI MIDDLE EAST POL'Y 59, 61 (June 1999) (predicting negative per-capita income growth in the
Gulf States), andDavid W. Lesch, Is Syria Readyfor Peace?Obstaclesto Integrationin the Global
Economy, VI MIDDLE EAST POL'Y 94, 101 (Feb. 199) (discussing the effects of globalization on
Syria) with Mark Dennis, The View from Tehran, NEWSWEEK INT'L, Dec. 14, 1998 (noting that
painfully low oil prices could actually strengthen Iranian moderates).
59. See Page, supra note 58, at 61.
60. See Richards, supra note 57, at 66.
61. See Jim Anderson, The European Union: Time for a Place at the Table?, VI MIDDLE
EAST POL'Y 160 (Feb. 1999) (noting difference in European and American policies towards Iran
and arguing that DUAL CONTAINMENT is squandering priceless U.S. assets when compared to those
of European allies).
62. Britain is one close U.S. ally that is paving new relations with Iran. It recently
reestablished diplomatic ties with Iran. See Ian Black, Britain and Iran to Revive Diplomatic
Relations, GUARDIAN (LONDON), Apr. 13, 1999, at 13.
63. See Gawdat G. Bahgat, Oil in the Gulf Prospectsfor the Twenty FirstCentury, 23 J.
ENERGY & DEV. 83, 91 (1998); see also Yousuf Hasan Jawad Mohammad, Demandfor Oil in the
Organizationfor Economic Cooperation & Development Revisited, 23 J. ENERGY & DEV. 95
(1998). See generally Jeffrey Sachs, International Economics: Unlocking the Mysteries of
Globalization,FOREIGN POLICY 97 (Spring, 1998).
64. See William Drozdiak, OPECAgrees to New Cuts in Output; Glut Has Sent Oil Prices
Plunging,WASH. POST, June 25, 1998, at CO I (alluding to importance of Iran's role in OPEC by
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Europe, and the Middle East stokes international energy competition,65
businesses have again turned their eyes to Iran's low production costs and
its ample petroleum supplies. " Oil majors are currently clambering over
each other for unobstructed access into the Persian and Caspian oil
East will continue to be the
environs. 67 Analysts predict that the Middle
68
"strategic prize" into the new millenium.

IV.

THE PERSIAN AND CASPIAN INVESTMENT ENVIRONS

"Victo 7 will belong to the people who are sitting on waves
of oil."
A. IranianPetroleum Sector
Due to its isolation, Iran's energy market remains largely untapped.70
As the second largest producer in OPEC, Iran is documented as having
over 90 billion barrels in oil reserves.7 With an oil production cost among
the lowest in the world-approximately $0.60 per barrel-Iran is a prime
target for increased production during periods of plummeting oil prices.7 2
Such low production costs, combined with nine percent of the world's oil
reserves,73 contributes to Iran's status as a major supplier of crude to the
discussing necessary comprise between Saudi Arabia and Iran in order to ensure oil cuts).
65. See John Calabrese, China and the PersianGulf Energyand Security, 53 MIDDLE EAST
1.351 (detailing China's energy investment in the Middle East).
66. See generally Bahgat, supra note 63; Mohammad, supra note 63; Sachs, supranote 63.
67. See S. Fredric Starr, et al., Symposium: Caspian Oil, Pipelinesand Politics, V MIDDLE
EAST POL'Y 27, 30-33 (Jan. 1998) (discussing the importance of Central Asia to international oil
demands).
68. See generally Robert R. Copaken, et al., Symposium: Policy Implications of the Price of
Oil, VI MIDDLE EAST POL'Y 34, 50 (June 1999).
69. See This Century Video Series: Evolution of Revolution-Revolution in Iran, (ABC
television broadcast, Apr. 10, 1999) (quoting Imam Khomeini in live translation during 1979
revolution and hostage crisis: "Carter tries to frighten us on the economic front. He does not have
the military courage to attack us. Victory will belong to the people who are sitting on waves of
oil."). Series hosted by Peter Jennings, abstract also available at ABC Web Page (visited Sep 2.,
1999) <http://abcnews.go.com/century/tvseries/index.html/>.
70. Iran maintains 32 producing oil fields-(25 onshore / 7 offshore)-that have been closed
to foreign investment since the Iranian Revolution. See Iran-Part2-The Oil & Gas Fields,48 APS
REV. OIL MARKET TRENDS (May 26, 1997) [hereinafter Part 2].
71. A barrel of oil is approximately 42 U.S. gallons. For background information on oil
production and development, see ENERGY INFORMATION ADMINISTRATION, PETROLEUM: AN
ENERGY PROFILE, 1999 (visited Sep. 8, 1999) <http://www.eia.doe.gov/>; see also Monouchehr
Takin, Future Oil and Gas: Can Iran Deliver?, 217 WORLD OIL 96 (1998).
72. See Iran: Buy-Back FightBack, BuS. MIDDLE EAST, Mar. 16, 1999.
73. See Bahgat, supra note 63, at 9 1.
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global market.74 Prior to the tightening of U.S. sanctions in 1995,
American companies annually purchased in excess of $4 billion USD of
Iranian crude.75
Iran's petroleum infrastructure is, however, desperately in need of
repair. 76 At its peak production, prior to the Fall of the Shah, Iran produced
an impressive 6 million barrels of oil per day (m/b/d)." By comparison,
Iran's current oil infrastructure has an estimated sustainability of only 3.6
m/b/d.7 8 Iran is seeking to raise this production level to 4.57 9m/b/d by the
year 2000, yet it requires significant development to do SO.
With the threat of overproduction and another possible drop in oil
prices, Iran has no choice but to improve its production capabilities or
suffer further export losses.80 Though cheap production outlays put Iran at
a significant advantage over higher cost production locales (e.g., the North
Sea), a struggling economy and increased domestic consumption prevent
it from exploiting this advantage.8 Experts posit that Iran requires
approximately $30 8billion
in USD to revitalize its oil and gas industries in
2
the coming decade.
B. IranianNatural Gas Sector
Due to this century's focus on oil production, Iran's natural gas
resources have largely been neglected.83 Although Iran is estimated at
having over 735 trillion cubic feet (t/c/f) in natural gas reserves,84 these
reserves require massive development." Significant capital expenditures

74. See generally Bahgat, supra note 63; Mohammad, supra note 63; Sachs, supra note 63.
75. See Greenberger, supra note 10 (stating that U.S. oil companies made purchases of
Iranian oil through foreign subsidiaries. Although 31 C.F.R. § 560.407 bars importation of Iranian
oil, U.S. companies were not prohibited from selling it on the open market prior to the tightening
of sanctions in 1995, see 31 C.F.R. § 560.407 (1999).
76. See Rathnell, supra note 35, at 411-12.
77. See Bahree I, supra note I, at 2.
78. See generally Part 2, supra note 70.
79. See id.
80. See Rathnell, supra note 3 5, at 412; see also Iran-Part I-Prospects and Geology, 48 APS
REV. OIL MARKET TRENDS (1997) (noting that a gain or loss of $1 barrel in crude prices results in
a gain or loss of $912.5 million USD in Iranian export earnings). Compare Bruce Stanley, OPEC"s
Firmness Could Usher in Higher Fuel Prices; Leaders Are Expected to Maintain Production Cuts
Until Next Year, AUSTIN AM. STATESMAN, Sept. 21, 1999, at D3 (discussing increasing temptation
for OPEC members to break quotas with recent rise in oil prices), with Renaissance of "Black
Gold"?, DRESDNER BANK TRENDS, Sept. 24, 1999, at 3 (discussing rise in oil prices from twelveyear low of under $10/barrel in December 1998, to over $20/barrel since July 1999).
81. See Takin, supra note 71, at 96.
82. See Rathnell, supra note 35, at 412.
83. See id.
84. See id.
85. See id.

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 1998

11

FLORIDA JOURNAL OF IN7"RNATIONAL LAW

Florida Journal of International Law, Vol. 12, Iss. 2 [1998], Art. 3

(Vol. 12

and technological improvements could help Iran position itself as a
primary provider of liquefied petroleum gas (LPG) to countries such as
Japan.86 But the successful exploration and production of these resources
demands foreign expertise. For this reason, it is not surprising that Iran has
placed emphasis on natural gas development in its most recent energy
offers.87
C. CaspianSea Development
In addition to its territorial petroleum and gas reserves, Iran
complements its energy resources with access to those in the Caspian
Sea.88 The Caspian region is frequently viewed as the next great oil market
after the North Sea.8 9 Though an accurate total is not available, experts
have inflated Caspian oil reserve estimates to as high as 100 billion
barrels.90 Proven oil reserves are more reasonably assessed at 16-32 billion
barrels.9
As a border state to the Caspian Sea, Iran offers a prime route for
marketing Caspian oil in the Persian Gulf.9 2 Naturally it is seeking
increased participation in Caspian Sea exploration.93 The Caspian Border
States-(Turkmenistan, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Russia, and Iran)-are still at
odds, however, over how these resources will be shared.94
The peaceful development of Caspian resources is considered vital to
the stability of Former Soviet States.95 It is a subject of worldwide interest

86. See id. Iran's long-term energy strategy puts a major emphasis on gas production, but
faces stiff competition from neighboring Gulf States including Oman and Qatar. See id.
87. Cf. Bahree 1,supra note 1.
88. See Bahgat, supra note 63, at 83, 89.
89. See id.
90. The U.S. government has inflated estimates of Caspian oil reserves to a level of 100
billion barrels. See Julia Nanay, The U.S. in the Caspian: The Divergence of Political and
Commercial Interests, VI MIDDLE EAST POL'Y 150 (Oct. 1998) (discussing commercial oil

initiatives in the Caspian region).
91. See ENERGY INFORMATION ADMINISTRATION, CASPIAN SEA REGION (1998) (visited Sept.
8, 1999) <http:/www.eia.doe.gov/cabs/caspian.html> (providing background information on
Caspian energy developments). Proven Caspian Sea reserves are comparable to the reserves in the
United States of 22 billion barrels, and the North Sea of 17 billion barrels.
92. Cf. id.
93. See Iran to Explore Disputed CaspianArea, OIL & GAS J. 34 (1998).
94. See Bahgat, supra note 63, at 90. CompareIran Stirs Up Trouble in Caspian Waters, 49
Oil Daily, (Sept. 10, 1999), available in 1999 WL 10014255.
95. The Clinton Administration considers the Caucasus of "vital interest" to the United
States. See generally Jean-Christophe Peuch, CaspianSea Oil: The Role ofPrivate Corporations,
22 FLETCHER F. WORLD AFF. 28 (1998) (citing James Talbott, A Farewell to Flashman:American

Policy in the Caucasus and Central Asia, Address at the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced
International Studies, Baltimore, Maryland, July 21, 1997, U.S. Department of State Dispatch, Vol.
8, No. 6, July 1997); see also STRATEGY, supra note 25.
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for both governments and multi-national corporations." Two models of
development are frequently deliberated.9 These include a territorial sea
model, where each state would control the reserves in its own sector, and
a lake model, where the reserves would be shared by all states on a
percentage basis.9 American sanctions policies will affect corporate
investments differently depending on which contract model is used. 99
If the border states agree to a lake model for some or all of the
exploration and development initiatives, the U.S. government is likely to
consider any regional agreement with an Iranian partnership arrangement
subject to U.S. sanctions.' Comparatively, the sea model will allow
corporations to avoid sanctions by negotiating with those, separate
governmental entities investing in geographical projects that exclude
Iranian participation. 01 ' In either case, sanctions will have a critical impact
on American business ventures as well as Iranian energy resource
development.
D. Geo-StrategicFactorsof the IranianMarket
Sitting at the crossroads to Asia, Iran is in the perfect position to
market both Caspian Sea and Persian energy resources. 10 2 Despite the
ruggedness of its terrain, Iran provides the shortest and arguably most
advantageous route for transporting oil and gas from the Caspian to a well
developed market in the Middle East. 3 Improvements in its oil
infrastructure could provide countries with increased demands (e.g., India
and Pakistan) with direct access to vital energy supplies."°
The benefit of developing multiple avenues for marketing energy
resources is often cited.' Few are able to accentuate the positive,
however, under the shadow cast by U.S. sanctions.'0 6 While Western oil
consortia currently plan pipeline developments from Turkmenistan to
Turkey, parochial governmental interests preclude serious consideration
of a pipeline in Iran. 7 Economic pressures will certainly increase the

96. See generally Peuch, supra note 95.
97. See Bahgat, supra note 63, at 90.
98. See id.
99. See Nanay, supra note 90, at 154-56.
100. See 31 C.F.R. § 560.206 et seq. (1999) (denoting prohibited transactions).
101. See Nanay, supranote 90, at 154.
102. See id. at 150.
103. See id.
104. See id.; see also Rathnell, supra note 35, at 412 (discussing Pakistani desires for gas
pipeline).
105. See Nanay, supra note 90, at 154.
106. See id.
107. See id.
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probability of such projects.' °8 Moreover, the development of Iranian
pipeline technology will also demand large amounts of foreign investment
and expertise. 9
E. CurrentInvestment Outlook
President Khatami and his predecessor President Rafsanjani each
recognized Iran's need for foreign direct investment." 0 In an effort to
improve Iran's economy, these administrations have sought to wean Iran
from dependence on oil exports by exploring new markets."' In fact, Iran
is now considered to have the most ambitious petrochemical expansion
program in the Middle East." 2 Its resource development projects are,
however, still subject to conservative scrutiny.
Articles 44 and 81 of the Iranian Constitution place all mineral
resources under state control and prevent Iran from divesting its natural
resources to non-nationals: "The granting of concessions to foreigners for
the formation of companies or institutions for commercial, industrial, and
agricultural purposes, or for the extraction of minerals, is absolutely
forbidden."" 3
Due to these constitutional restraints, Iranian energy offers require the
support of its religious parliament-the Majlis."l4 The Majlis must pass
provisions allowing for limited foreign investments prior to mineral
measures to open a
resource contracts." 5 In 1991, the Majlis approved
16
limited number of contracts to foreign investors."

108. See Turkmenistan: Trans-Iran Oil Pipeline, 51 APS REV. OIL MARKET TRENDS (Sept.
21, 1998).
109. See Nanay, supra note 90, at 154.
110. Compare Rathnell, supra note 35, at 411, with Amuzegar, supra note 49.
111. See Iran-Profile-Figuresin the Oil Ministry andthe NIOC: Dr.MohammedHadiNejad
Hosseinian, 48 APS REV. DOWNSTREAM TRENDS (June 9, 1997) (noting Iran's 25-year plan to
build 30 petrochemical units at a cost of $12 billion).
112. See Iran-ThePetrochemicalSector, 48 APS REV. DOWNSTREAM TRENDS (June 2, 1999).
113. The Iranian Constitution was drafted during the revolution and exhibits strong efforts to
provide protection from Western involvement. See HAMID ALGAR, CONSTITUTION OF THE ISLAMIC
REPUBLIC OF IRAN 45, 57 (1980) (translating the Iranian Constitution, Articles 44 and 81); see also
ASGHAR SCHIRAZi, THE CONSTITUTION OF IRAN: POLITICS AND THE STATE IN THE ISLAMIC

REPUBLIC 22 (1997) (discussing the drafting process).
114. See Maria Kielmas, Mixed Reactions to Opening Up of the ExplorationSector (Iranian
Petroleum Sector), 65 PETROLEUM ECON. 3 (Aug. 1, 1998).
115. See Iran-The Buy-Back Approach, 52 APS GAS MARKET TRENDS

(Mar. 29,

1999)[hereinafter Buy-Back].
116. See Kielmas, supra note 114, at 3; see also Iran Signs Oil Contract with French,
CanadianFirms, DEUTSCHE PRESSE AGENTUR (Apr. 5, 1999).
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With the Majlis approval, Iran initially placed eleven offers up for
bid." 7 As of March 1999, a total of 43 Iranian offers were on the table." 8
These offers indicate Iran's willingness to work closer with foreign
companies in resource development.'
Though the most lucrative
investment opportunities are not yet for bid, 20 Iran is having much success
in attracting foreign interest.' Its recent "advertising campaigns" evince
strong desires to have U.S. sanctions lifted.'
V. OVERVIEW OF U.S.-IRANIAN SANCTIONS

"We are probably stuck until 2001

....

,f23

A. Sanctions Authority
The underlying authority for U.S.-Iranian trade sanctions inheres to the
executive power to regulate foreign affairs and congressional authority to
regulate commerce. 124 Although critics question the extraterritorial
application of this authority, 12 stateside power to issue sanctions is firmly
rooted in U.S. judicial decisions. 26 The result is a two-tier regulatory
regime incorporating executive orders and congressional acts with little

117. See Kielmas, supranote 114, at 3.
118. See e.g., Bhushan Bahree, EuropeanOilMajorsMarchBack to Iran-U.S.SanctionsKeep
American Rivals on SidelinesforNow, WALL ST. J.,
Mar. 10, 1999, at A 19 [hereinafter Bahree 11]
(stating that the Iranian parliament has approved $5.4 billion USD in investment of projects and
estimating needed investment for the offers at $8 billion (JSD).
119. See id.
120. See Major Producers Walk the Tightrope, 219 WORLD OIL 106 (Aug. 1, 1998)
[hereinafter Tightrope].
121. See Bahree II, supra note 118.
122. See Iran's Bid to Lure Oil Investment Succeeding Despite US. Sanctions, OIL GAS J.
(Apr. 5, 1999).
123. See Iran: PressureAgainst US. Sanctions Grows, MIDDLE EAST ECON. PRODUCTION
DIG., Mar. 12, 1999 [hereinafter Pressure](quoting CONOCO President of Asia, Africa, & Middle

East Exploration & Production).
124. See U.S. CONST. arts. I, § 8, cl. 2, II, § 2. For an excellent treatise on shared Executive
and Congressional Foreign Affairs authority under U.S. Constitutional Law, see Louis HENKIN,
FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE CONSTITUTION (1996).

125. Compare Alexander, supra note 13, at 1601 (questioning the validity of extraterritorial
application of U.S. sanctions laws), with Charles Tait Graves, Extraterritorialityandits Limits: The
Iran and Libya Sanctions Act of 1996, 21 HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L. REv. 715 (1998) (calling
ILSA's extraterritorial application "radical"), and Wynn H. Segall, Running on Empty: US.
EconomicSanctions andExport Controlsin 1997, 32 INT'L L. 271-72 (1998) (describing European
and Russian threats of complaint to World Trade Organization over U.S. sanctions policies).
126. See United States v. Arch Trading, 987 F.2d 1087, 1093 (4th Cir. 1993) (citing Dames
& Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654, 675 (1981)).
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judicial interference.
Over the last few years the President and Congress have contributed to
the complexity of the Iranian sanctions regime.' The President, under
political pressure from Congress and lobbying groups, tightened Iranian
sanctions on U.S. companies by exercising authority granted him under the
International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA), 50 U.S.C §
1701, et seq., and the National Emergency Act (NEA), 50 U.S.C. § 1601,
et seq.' 28 Additionally, Congress, intent on applying sanctions abroad,
issued its own statutory prohibitions through Public Law 104-172, the
Iran-Libya Sanctions Act (ILSA) of 1996.129
B. Executive Orders and Associated Implementing Provisions
Under the IEEPA and NEA, the President can implement trade
regulations provided the President makes a declaration of an "unusual and
extraordinary threat" and periodically consults with Congress on the
issue."' In 1995 and 1996, President Clinton exercised this authority,
strengthening and clarifying Iranian sanctions policies with Executive
Orders 12,957, 12,959, and 13,059.' These orders established regulatory
provisions in the Iranian Transactions Regulations (ITR) 31 C.F.R. § 560,
supplementing those already outlined in the Iranian Asset Control
Regulations (IACR), 31 C.F.R § 535.132 Since the Clinton Administration
has maintained the declared emergency with Iran, 33 these IEEPA
person
prohibitions continue to regulate "foreign trade that involves any
134
States.
United
the
of
jurisdiction
the
to
or any property subject
Violations of IEEPA regulations are subject to congressionally
mandated civil and criminal penalties.'35 For a major multi-national
corporation, the $11,000 strict liability civil penalty encapsulated in 50

127. For a comprehensive look at the political development of the Iranian sanctions regime,
see generally Lucien J.Dhooge, Meddling with the Mullahs: An Analysis ofthe Iran and Libya
Sanctions Act of 1996,27 DENVER J.INT'L L. & POL'Y 1 (1998).
128. The IEEPA authority originally stems from The Trading with the Enemy Act (TWEA).
See 50 U.S.C.A. §§ 1601, 1701, et. seq. (West 1998); see also 50 U.S.C.A. App. § 5 (West, 1998).
129. See ILSA, supra note 12.
130. See 50 U.S.C.A. §§ 1701(a), 1702(a) (West 1998).
131. See Exec. Order No. 12,957, supra note 12; see also Exec. OrderNo. 12,959; Exec. Order
No. 13,059, supra note 20; 31 C.F.R §§ 535, 560.
132. See id.
133. See William J.Clinton, Notice-Continuation ofran Emergency, March 10, 1999, (visited
Apr. 27, 1999) <http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/>.
134. See 31 C.F.R. § 535.201.
135. Iranian sanctions penalties are subject to Congressionally mandated changes. Though the
statute quotes a $10k civil penalty, the Federal Civil Penalties Inflation Adjustment Act of 1990
adjusted the original $1Ok penalty to $1Ik.Compare 50 U.S.C.A. § 1705(a) (West 1998), with 31
C.F.R. §§ 535.701, 560.701.
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1) prevention of export-import banking assistance for exports
to a sanctioned person;
2) prohibition of export licensing of goods or technology to
a sanctioned person;
3) bar on loans over $10 million in a twelve month period for
a sanctioned person;
4) restriction of a sanctioned person from dealing in Federal
Reserve funds;
5) prevention ofU.S. government contract procurements with
a sanctioned person;
6) moratorium on importation of goods from a sanctioned
person.
These provisions have the potential to upset any major international
transaction requiring financing or insurance from a U.S. institution." 6 But
even though they appear extreme, the United States has not yet enforced
ILSA extraterritorially against companies dealing with Iran.'
Contrary to its application, the terms set forth in Section 14 of ILSA
show that Congress intended the consequences of this act to be sweeping
in nature. Definitions 14(4) and 14(9) ensure that all aspects of the
petroleum industry are covered. "Development" includes "exploration,
extraction, refining, or transportation by pipeline of petroleum
resources,"' 58 and "investment" is defined as any contract that includes the
"responsibility for development," "purchase of shares or ownership," or
any "form of participation that results in royalties or profits."' 9
Supplementary definitions denote even further statutory breadth. Section
14(1 0) "Iran," 14(14) "Person," and 14(15) "Petroleum Resources" make
the act applicable to all corporate-like entities that participate
in any gas
60
or petroleum transaction with any Iranian instrumentality.
Indeed Congress has left businesses with little room to maneuver. Its
intent is clear-any major energy transaction with Iran is prohibited.
16
Although some legal scholars have tried to split hairs over this issue, '
loose interpretation of the statute really is not persuasive. On its face and

156. See id. § 6.
157. The U.S. State Department reviews foreign transactions for their validity under ILSA in
a long and drawn out process that allows for waivers if the State Department deems that base
countries adequately discourage Iran from state-sponsored terrorism. See US. Govt: Sanctions
Decision on Iran Oil Deals Months Away, Dow Jones Telerate Energy Serv., Feb. 18, 1999
[hereinafter Dow TELRA IT 1].

158. See ILSA, supra note 12, § 14.
159. See id. § 14.
160. See id. § 14.
161. See, e.g., Rex J. Zedalis, The Total SA Case Meaning of "Investment" Under the ILSA,
92 AM. J. INT'L L. 539, 547 (1998) (arguing that ILSA will pose an interpretive challenge for
lawyers).
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in the courts, ILSA appears remarkably tight.'62
As tight as they are, ILSA provisions do contain a political escape
hatch. They provide the possibility for presidential waivers under sections
4(C) and 9(C).' 63 These waivers exist in situations where the President
concludes 1) that nationals conducting the transactions are from countries
undertaking substantial measures to curb Iran's threatening
activities-(ILSA Section 4(C) Waiver), or 2) upon the determination that
a waiver is in the national interest-(ILSA Section 9(C) Waiver).
In May 1998, the President avoided enforcing sanctions and set a
waiver precedent by issuing a section 9(C) waiver to TOTAL SA after it
replaced CONOCO as the primary contracting agent for the development of
the Sirri gas fields and entered a new contract for South Pars." Not
surprisingly, the President chose the waiver presenting the most breathing
room. Under section 9(C) no justification of substantial measures must be
outlined; the President must merely make a determination that a waiver is
in the nation's best interest.'65 The Executive Branch is currently
considering further waivers for contracts signed by Bow VALLEY and
ELF. 66 As of August 1999, it has yet to make an announcement on the
issue.
These waivers have bolstered support for a change in sanctions policy.
They have made consistent sanctions enforcement impossible. 67 Even
168
though the Executive Branch recently eased some restrictions on Iran,
it is unlikely that Congress or the President will lift ILSA prohibitions
before their expiration date. 69 The President could terminate ILSA by
certifying that Iran has ceased its efforts to acquire WMD technology and
declaring that it is no longer a state-sponsor of terrorism, however, it
appears more likely that this statute will run its course as nothing more

162. See generally ILSA, supra note 12.
163. See ILSA, supra note 12, §§ 4(C), 9(C).
164. See Madeline Albright, Statement by the SecretaryofState, IranandLibya SanctionsAct
(ILSA): Decision in the South Pars Case, May 18, 1998, (visited Sept. 2, 1999)
<http://www.usia.gov> (announcing waivers).
165. See id.
166. See Campion Walsch, U.S. Sanctions Waiver on Iran 'sBalal Oil DealNot Assured, Dow
JONES NEWS SERV., Apr. 5, 1999 (quoting U.S. State Department Spokesman: "We are deeply
concerned about this investment. The U.S. remains strongly opposed to investment in Iran's
petroleum sector.").
167. See id.
168. See US. Eases Three Trade Embargoes, HOUSTON CHRON., July 27, 1999, at 3 (noting
recent ease in sanctions on Iran, Libya, and Sudan, for food and medical supplies).
169. Compare Carol Giacoma, Sanctions Deemed Unlikely in Latest Iranian Oil Deal.
SEATTLE TIMES, Mar. 4, 1999, at A21, with Paul Bagnell, Bow Valley Inks Offshore Deal in Iran:
May Face US. Sanctions: Ottawa Ready to Resist Any Pressurefrom Washington, NAT'L POST,
Apr. 5, 1999, at CO.
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U.S.C. § 1705(a) is peanuts compared to a billion-dollar contract in the
Iranian energy sector.'36 However, the criminal penalty outlined in 50
U.S.C. § 1705(b) negates the practicality of a simple cost-benefit
investment analysis. 37 This code section provides a significant deterrent
to any "officer, director, or agent of any corporation who knowingly
participates in such a violation."' 38 It does so by imposing a fine of up to
$50,000 and/or up to ten years imprisonment.' 39 Furthermore, if additional
criminal charges are present, the higher of the instituted penalties
controls. 4 ° Few corporate executives are likely to gamble with sanctions
when their own careers are at stake. As such, multi-national companies are
treading lightly around these prohibitions.
The agency primarily responsible for sanctions enforcement is the
Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC).' 4 ' OFAC is a branch of the
Department of Treasury. It publishes numerous supplementary documents
illuminating federal interpretations of the sanctions regime.'42 When read
in conjunction with 31 C.F.R. §§ 535, 560, OFAC publications provide
few exceptions to the prohibition on trade with Iran. A corporation's
primary means of avoiding direct prohibitions is to file a request for an
export waiver license. 4 3 The granting of such a license and the
enforcement of sanctions violations is highly political, however, because
from both the Executive Branch and the U.S.
OFAC receives guidance
44
Department of State.
Aside from specific case-by-case OFAC licensing approvals, virtually
all U.S. trade in the Iranian petroleum sector is prohibited. 145 Generally,
goods, technology, and services can not be exported, re-exported, sold, or
supplied directly or indirectly from the United States or by a U.S. citizen
to Iran or the Government of Iran.146 Additionally, U.S. persons, including
foreign branches of U.S. banks and trading companies, are prohibited from
136. See 50 U.S.C.A. § 1705(a).
137. See id. § 1705(b).
138. Id. § 1705(b).
139. See id. § 1705(b).
140. See id. § 1705(b).
141. See Cecil Hunt, Overview of U.S. Export Controls, 782 PRIVATE L. INST. 17, 23 (1998)
(providing general background information on the Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC)).
142. See IRAN-WHAT YOUNEED TO KNOW ABOUT U.S. SANCTIONS, U.S. DEPT. OF TREASURY,
OFFICE OF FOREIGN ASSETS CONTROL (1999) (visited Apr. 27, 1999) <http://www.treas.gov/ofac>;
see also 31 C.F.R. § 560.201 et seq.
143. See id.
144. See OFAC PUBLICATION, Export Controls Compliance: Don't Neglect OFAC (PART 1),
XIII SOCIETY FOR INTL AFF. NEWS NoTEs 2 (Jan./Feb. 1999) [hereinafter SIA 1](visited Sept. 2.,
1999) <http://www.treas.gov/ofac>; see also ILSA § 6(2), supra note 12 (delineating presidential
licensing authority).
145. See SIA 1,supra note 144 at 4.
146. See id.
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.engaging in any transactions, including purchase, sale, transportation,
swap,47financing, or brokering transactions, related to goods or services of

Iran.1

As interpreted, few loopholes exist. The Iranian sanctions regulations
place a significant damper on the ability of a U.S. company to invest in the
Iranian energy sector.1 48 They make even planning for such future
prospects difficult.149 By forcing financial institutions to implement assetblocking procedures on prohibited transactions, any attempt at completing
a business deal with a prohibited party is not likely to receive financing
without approval from OFAC. 5°
C. Iran-LibyaSanctions Act (ILSA) of 1996
In addition to the standing trade and transaction prohibitions outlined
in 31 C.F.R. §§ 535, 560, Congress passed ILSA in 1996 in an attempt to
curb foreign trade with Iran, specifically in the petroleum industry.'
Section 5 of ILSA outlines a scienter requirement. 52 It requires the
President to impose at least two of six sanctions if a person with actual
knowledge made an investment of $20 million, (or a combination of
investments within a twelve month period in excess of $20 million), that
"directly and significantly" contribute to the enhancement of Iran's ability
to develop its petroleum resources.'53
Although companies subject to U.S. jurisdiction are already restricted
from trading with Iran by 31 C.F.R. § 560, ILSA restraints are also used.
They apply not only to companies under U.S. jurisdiction but also to their
foreign counterparts. 54 Section 6 of ILSA outlines the various possible
ramifications. Upon a finding of non-compliance, the President is to
impose at least two of the following:'.

147. See 31 C.F.R. § 560.206 (prohibiting financing or brokering of transactions by a U.S.
person relating to goods or services of Iranian origin).
148. See generally id. § 560.206.
149. See 31 C.F.R. § 560.525(a)(1) (preventing legal advice in transactions that may violate
sanctions prohibitions).
150. See 31 C.F.R. § 560 et seq.
151. See ILSA, supra note 12, § 3(a).
152. See id. § 5(a).
153. See id. § 5(a). ILSA's threshold amount was initially $40 million but its terms lowered
it to $20 million after the first year of implementation. See id. § 5(a). The multi tier structure of
sanctions continues to result in confusion in current reporting. See Libya Muddling On,
ECONOMIST, Sept. 4, 1999, at 47 (stating incorrectly that the limitation of investment under ILSA
is currently capped at $40 million).
154. See ILSA, supra note 12, § 5(a).
155. See id. &6.
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than a political paperweight. 7 °
As previously mentioned, ILSA provisions are not indefinite. Section
13 of ILSA provides a "Sunset Clause" terminating the Act five years after
its enactment on August 5, 2001 .17 Given the intense lobbying pressure
against the sanctions, ILSA probably will not be renewed. 172 Still, until the
Executive Branch lifts the declared emergency, individuals and businesses
under U.S. jurisdiction will remain subject to 31 U.S.C. §§ 535, 560
regulations.
D. Supplementary Enforcement: Other Agencies and Other Laws
The lead organization for Iranian sanctions enforcement is OFAC, but
there are a number of other regulatory agencies that keep watch on Iranian
trade. Other agencies that share export-licensing jurisdiction with OFAC
include the State Department's Office of Defense Trade Control (DTC)
and the Commerce Department's Bureau of Export Administration
(BXA).' 73 Corporations dealing in goods that can be considered "dual use"
technology (having both military and industrial applications) or desiring
to export approved medicines or foodstuffs may be required to file
separate licenses with these agencies. In enforcing trade prohibitions,
OFAC, DTC, and BXA can grant each other reciprocal
enforcement
74
authority when reviewing licenses and violations. 1
Although OFAC regulations do not mandate that corporations maintain
an OFAC awareness representative, the difficulty of sifting through the
various regulatory procedures almost makes it a necessity. No standard
OFAC licensing form exists, and coordination with multiple governmental
agencies is cause for confusion.'

170. See id. But cf ILSA, supra note 12, § 8.
171. See ILSA, supra note 12, § 8.
172. Over 500 U.S. corporations have formed the National Foreign Trade Council to lobby
Washington on sanctions policies. See Crow, supra note 31; see also Pressure,supra note 123.
173. See SIA I, supra note 144, at 2-4.
174. See id.; see also George Gedda, US.-Iran Relations Remain Stagnant, ASSOCIATED
PRESS
REPORT,
Aug.
!,
1999
(visited
Sept.
2,
1999
<http://www.iriantrade.org/_NewsUpdates/00000258.htm/> (discussing U.S. ease in sanctions for
foodstuffs and medicines).
175. See SIA, Isupra note 144, at 2-4.
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1 - Iranian Sanctions Regime

Prohibitions
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Penalties

Termination
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*IEEPA/NEA

-U.S. Jurisdiction
-BX w/ U.S. Assets
-Iranian Transaction
(any goods/services)
-BX w/SDN
(prohibitive party)

-U.S. Treas. Dept
-OFAC Enforced
-Legal Decision
--Civil Penalty
$1lk
--Crim. Penalty
10 Yrs &/or $50k

*Executive Determination
-Lift Declared Emergency
-Congressional Act
-Remove Exec. Authority

-Foreign Merger
-Strategic Partnership
.OFAC Licensing
-(e.g. Swap Deals)
-Investment Planning
-Lobbying Campaign

-Executive Determination
-Remove pariah status
-Congressional Act
-Retract ILSA
-Sunset Clause (8/5/2001)
-Automatic Expiration
-International Challenge

-Foreign Merger
-Strategic Partnerships
*OFAC Licensing
-Limited Investments
-Under $20 million
-Political Shielding
- 9 (C) Waiver

-(e.g., WTO ruling)

- Foreign legislation

-50 U.S.C.§1601
-50 U.S.C.§1701
-31 C.F.R.§535
-31 C.F.R.§560
-EXEC ORDER
-EO 12,957/59
-EO 13,059

-Additional Acts

•ILSA
-P. L. 104-172

-U.S. Jurisdiction
-BX w/ U.S. Assets
-Energy Transaction
->$20 Million USD
-Foreign Parties
-Energy Transaction
->$20 Million USD

-U.S. State Dept.
-Political Decision
-Trade Restrictions
-Executive Choice
-2 of 6 sanctions

- Economic pressures
-U.S. Jurisdiction
- BX w/ U.S. Assets
- Defense Related

-U.S. State Dept.
-DTC Enforced
-Various Penalties

-Congressional Act

-Licensing

-EAR
-50 U.S.C. §2401

Services/Articles
-U.S. Jurisdiction
-BX w/ U.S. Assets

-U.S. Comm. Dept.
-BXA Enforced

-Congressional Act
-Expired in 1994

-Licensing

-15 C.F.R. §730

- Defense Related

-Various Penalties

-Now Falls Under IEEPA

*AECA
-22 U.S.C. §2778
-22 C.F.R. §120

-

- "Dual Use" Items

-ATEDPA
-8 U.S.C. § 1189
FCPA

-U.S. Jurisdiction
-Any Person
-Terrorist Act

-18 U.S.C. §1001

-Corrupt Practices

-Executive Authority

-U.S. Justice Dept.
-DOJ Enforced
-Various Penalties

-Congressional Act

*N/A
-Criminal Statutes

Note: This table is intended for quick reference and should not be considered all-inclusive.

Additionally, Iranian sanctions issues may involve both questions of
fraud that are prosecutable under 18 U.S.C. § 1001 et seq., and issues
involving anti-terrorism policies, outlined in the Antiterrorism and
Effective Death Penalty Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1189.176 A corporation acting

176. See id.
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without an OFAC sanctions awareness representative may thus be caught
off guard by the complexity of sanctions issues. It may unwittingly enter
into transactions through third-party organizations (front companies for
sanctioned countries), that are based in countries less affected by U.S.
sanctions measures (e.g.; London or Japan). Such transactions are
prohibitive if any of the contracting parties are found on an OFAC
Specially Designated National (SDN) list. 77
' OFAC regularly updates these
lists to ensure companies conducting prohibited business with Iran are
boycotted.' 78 An OFAC awareness representative can therefore provide
considerable help in ensuring that sanctions procedures and advisories are
readily updated.
OFAC advises corporations to monitor the constant SDN updates.' 7 9 A
failure to properly monitor transactions may result in a suspended
transaction with assets "blocked" or "frozen" (e.g., money, checks, drafts,
debts, obligations, notes, letters, warehouse receipts, bills of sale,
evidences of title, contracts goods, chattles, stocks, ships, goods on ships,
etc.). 80 Since OFAC relies on major financial institutions to block/freeze
assets, a stop-transaction notice may occur suddenly with little warning.
Although a company may be able to avoid serious criminal penalties and
regain its property in the event its assets are frozen, the suspension or loss
of ownership privileges combined with the time value of money may
create a substantial loss of interest and monetary gain.'
E. ForeignResponse to US.-IranianSanctions
Foreign States havebeen extremely critical of U.S. efforts to impose
extraterritorial sanctions on non-U.S. companies.' 82 Though the intent
behind Iranian sanctions was to lead by example,8 3 both the Legislative
and Executive Branches instituted their measures without international
consensus.' 84 Even America's closest trade partners (e.g., Canada), have
177. See id. at 2.
178. See id.
179. See id.
180. See id.
181. See id.
182. See. e.g., Thomas W. Lippman, Politicians at Odds on Sanctions as Policy;
Administration Says Tool Can Be Costly, WASH. POST, May 19, 1998, at A 17.
183. See The Comprehensive Iranian Sanctions Act of 1995-S. 277, Hearing Before the
Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, United States Senate, 104th Cong. 47, 75
(1995) [hereinafter Senate Hearings] (testimony of Kensington & attached: Kenneth R.
Timmerman, Our ConfusedSignals over Iran, WALL ST. J., Feb. 15, 1999) (stating that the CONocO
deal would "fund terrorism" and that sanctions are needed to "send a message" to our allies).
184. See Ellen Laipson, et. al., Symposium: U.S. Policy Toward Iran-From Containment to
Relentless Pursuit?, IV MIDDLE EAST POL'Y 5 (1995); see also William Wallace & Jan Zielonka,
Misunderstanding Europe, I FOREIGN AFFAIRS 65, 75 (Nov./Dec., 1998) (quoting Senator Jesse
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responded with enmity towards U.S. sanctions. 8 ' These governments have
issued blocking
legislation in order to protect their own multi-national
81 6
corporations.
Among others, Member States of the European Union, Canada, and
Mexico have all instituted blocking legislation. 87 Such legislation
typically requires companies threatened by sanctions to contact an
appropriate national agency and notify them of the dilemma.'88 This
presents the possibility for dispute resolution in a venue such as the World
Trade Organization (WTO).' 89 The fact that no nation has issued a formal
WTO complaint exhibits international desires to avoid an acrimonious
trade dispute. 9 ° Yet even with a formal complaint, resolution might be
difficult since the United States continues to refuse to submit the issues to
international organizations for resolution.' 9' Blocking legislation therefore
places significant pressure on the United States to abide by its current
section 9(C) waiver precedent for foreign companies.' 92 It sets the stage for
a potential international legal battle between sovereigns with conflicting
policies.
Helms walking out on the British Foreign Secretary over sanctions issues: "To hell with
international law."). ,
185. See Bagnell, supra note 169, at COI (quoting spokesman for Canadian Department of
Foreign Affairs and International Trade regarding possible U.S. efforts to sanction Canadian
investment deals in Iran: "We don't like it. There is nothing illegal about Canadian companies
doing business in Iran or Libya." Also noting that the French Foreign Ministry does not recognize
U.S. unilateral sanctions as legitimate: "ELF is free to sign contracts with Iran if it wants. It's a
commercial decision.").
186. See Peter L. Glossop, Recent UnitedStates Trade Restrictions Affecting Trade with Cuba,
Iran, and Libya-A View from Outside the United States, Paper 2A presented at International
Resources Law Conference sponsored by Rocky Mountain Mineral Law Foundation and IBA
Section on Energy & Natural Resources Law, Denver, Colorado, Mar. 3-4, 1997 [hereinafter Rocky
Mountain Paper 2A]; see also M. Jean Anderson, U.S. Economic Sanctions on Cuba, Iran & Libya:
Helms Burton & the Iran & Libya Sanctions Act, Paper 2B; presented at International Resources
Law Conference sponsored by Rocky Mountain Mineral Law Foundation and IBA Section on
Energy & Natural Resources Law, Denver, Colorado, Mar. 3-4, 1997 [hereinafter Rocky Mountain
Paper 2B].
187. See id.
188. See Rocky Mountain Paper 2B, supra note 186.
189. But see Gary Hufbauer, Does International Law Matter to Congress, 92 AM. SOC'Y INT'L
L. PROC. 332, 334 (1998). The United States refuses to submit the issue of sanctions for
international review with the World Trade Organization. Id.
190. Seeid.
191. See also Harvey Oyer, Note, The Extraterritorial Effects of U.S. Unilateral Trade
Sanctions and Their Impact on U.S. Obligations Under NAFTA, I I FLA. J. INT'L L. 429,444-45
(1997) (discussing U.S. refusal to submit sanctions issues to the WTO and noting that foreign
powers may also issue "clawback" provisions authorizing parties affected by U.S. sanctions to
countersuit for damages).
192. See Rocky Mountain Paper 2A, supra note 186; Rocky Mountain Paper 2B, supra note
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VI. LEGAL IMPACT OF U.S.-IRANIAN SANCTIONS

A. US. CorporateStrategies
"We're1 going right to the edge, but we're not crossing the

line[.]

The most interesting development regarding Iranian sanctions has been
their impact on international energy investments. As of August 1999, no

U.S. company has entered into a major transactional agreement for
investment in the Iranian energy sector." The effect of Executive Order
12,957 and CONOCO's backout has been a flight of capital investment
opportunities from U.S. companies to foreign firms.'9 5 As could be
expected, this has caused an outcry over job losses and the inability
of
196
America to stimulate Iranian reform through economic means.

U.S. multi-national corporations have stepped up lobbying campaigns
against Congress. 97 They remain "committed to doing business in Iran,"'9a
and are positioning themselves for the day sanctions are lifted. 9 9 Although
federal regulations prohibit companies under U.S. jurisdiction from

entering any major Iranian energy contract, corporate tenacity is keeping
a foot in the door. U.S. corporate activity demonstrates a threefold strategy
for dealing with U.S. sanctions: 1) continuous dialogue, 2) limited
investment and planning, and 3) merger and partnership arrangements.

193. See Masood Farivar, ARCO/Exploration/lran-4: Steps for Entering Energy Sector, Dow
2, 1999 (quoting Don Voelte, President of ARco on the limits of U.S.
sanctions laws).
194. See Maher Chmaytelli, U.S. Oil Firms Left Out, Frustratedas Iran Opensfor Business,
Agence France-Presse, Mar. 18, 1999 (noting European anxiety over possible U.S. competition in
Iranian market if sanctions are lifted).
195. Cf Bahree II, supra note 118, at A19 (noting U.S. firms barred by American sanctions).
196. See Crow, supranote 3 1.
197. See id.
198. Over 450 delegates from 150 companies attended the 1998 Iranian sponsored oil
conference in London, England-U.S. firms were well represented. See Chmaytelli, supranote 194
(quoting CONOCO President Archie Dunham: "CoNoco is ready to return to Iran as soon as
sanctions are lifted."); see also Anne K. Rhodes, Iran Pressing FiscalIncentives, Assurances to
Attract Investors to its PetrochemicalSector, 97 OIL & GAS J.20 (1999) (discussing increased
foreign investment opportunities in the Iranian petrochemical sector and quoting CEO Archie
Dunham at the March 1999 Middle East Petroleum and Gas Conference in Dubai, United Arab
Emirates).
199. See id.See also Iran Open to Offers, TECH. REV. MIDDLE EAST, July 15, 1998.
JONES NEWS SERVICE, Mar.
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1. Continuous Dialogue
Continuous dialogue appears to be the most prominent corporate tactic
for combating unilateral sanctions.00 Even foreign companies with major
U.S. assets and high susceptibility to sanctions measures (e.g., SHELL) are
now seeking to re-establish association with Iranian counterparts. 20 ' These
businesses are doing so by attending government-sponsored investment
203
conferences 202 and by actively bidding on Iranian investment offers.
Corporations are laying the framework for future Iranian investment
relationships, by forming cross-border business contacts. Although U.S.
regulations prevent performance of Iranian investment contracts, they do
not preclude attendance at Iranian conferences and active bidding. 204 It is
also doubtful that sanctions can repress a contract for performance at a
later date. Energy firms are therefore able to establish market positions by
evaluating the Iranian reaction to future contract terms. Such continuous
dialogue may appear to be of little value, but it actually benefits both
parties. Dialogue provides Iranian sponsors with an idea of what a
company has to offer, while Western investment companies gather market
intelligence on their competitors' tactics. Subsequently, Iran is able to
tease the market by holding out its most lucrative deals in order to obtain

200. SHELL initially avoided Iranian offers because of its assets in the United States, but it later
returned to negotiations with Iran over South Pars Gas development and is currently an active
bidder on further Iranian contracts. See US.Firm BidsforOil Schemes Despite Sanctions,MIDDLE
EAST ECON. DIG., Jan. 29 1999, at 16 [hereinafter Bids] (discussing ARCO's bids for contracts in
Iran); see also Buy-Back, supra note 115.
201. See id.See also Shell Poisedto Strike Dealwith Iran/ Oil GiantSaidPreparedto Ignore
Threat of US.-Imposed Sanctions, HOUSTON CHRON., Aug. 19, 1999, at 2 [hereinafter SHELL
Poised] (quoting SHELL source: "SHELL would go ahead with the Soroush and Nowruz project.
American sanctions are a concern, but Shell will seek a waiver").
202. Iran began utilizing conferences to actively solicit Western development interest 1991.
It continues to rely on such conferences to market its oil investment opportunities. See Oil's New
World Order: Fora Quarterof a Century Oil-ProducingCountriesHave Foughtto Keep Western
Companies Out; Now They are Wooing Them Back ECONOMIST 67, 13 July 1991; see also News
Release, Status Report on Iran'sEfforts to Lure Oil-FieldInvestment, in PETROLEUM INTELLIGENCE
WKLY, May 19, 1997 (discussing Iranian showcase oil and gas conference in Esfahan, Iran
attracting some of the biggest names in the industry); News Release, SMI Ltd, The Iranian
Sept.
4,
1999)
Petroleum Summit Announcement, (visited
<http://www.iraniantrade.org/cyprus spcl.html> (announcing 14-15 September, 1998 oil and gas
conference at Hilton Hotel in Nicosia, Cyprus hosted by the National Iranian Oil Company and
British Petroleum).
203. U.S. companies are spending thousands of dollars just for their representatives to attend
conferences on Iranian investment opportunities. See Andrea Lorenze, CanadianAdvantage GainingEntry to Vast Resources of Iran and Iraq, OILWEEK, May 3, 1999; see also Bids, supra
note 200.
204. See 31 C.F.R. § 560 et seq. (1999).
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more agreeable terms from those bidders hungriest for access to its energy
sector.
2. Limited Investment and Planning
Some companies, such as ARCO, have stepped beyond dialogue into the
realm of limited investment and planning strategies." 5 In 1997, the Iranian
Majlis passed a resolution allowing corporations to establish branch
offices in Iran.2 °6 ARCO was one of the first companies to express interest
in this opportunity, knowing that half the battle of economic competition
is having direct access to the local market.20 7 Incidentally, BRITISH
PETROLEUM (BP) has already taken this action, exhibiting cross-cultural
wisdom for developing business relations in the Middle East.2 8
In addition to seeking a branch office, ARCO exercised options
available under 31 C.F.R. § 560.523 allowing importation of commercial
information.2 9 By utilizing this provision, ARCO improved its commercial
geographical data on Iran.210
investment readiness by purchasing updated
211
suit.
followed
Other companies quickly
Although most major oil companies are involved in some sort of
planning for investment in the Iranian energy sector, direct investment is
not a realistic option for many corporations. A few companies are,
however, seeking to sidestep sanctions effects through limited investment
options. These typically include OFAC approved swaps and potential
exploration projects under $20 million.1 2
A swap arrangement allows companies like MOBIL or CHEVRON to
avoid transportation difficulties by delivering to Iran a certain amount of
unrefined crude from the Caspian region in exchange for refined Iranian
oil in the Gulf region.2" 3 MOBIL has already executed swap transactions

205. See Bids, supra note 200, at 16.
206. See Iran: ForeignBranch Offices Allowed, 20 MIDDLE EAST ExEc. REP. 4 (1997); see
also Farivar, supra note 193 (discussing ARCO's desire to open a branch office in Iran).
207. See Amy McClellan, EU FirmsExemptedfrom US. Sanctions,LLOYD'S LIST INT'L, May
25, 1998, at 4 (noting BP's plans to open a representative office in Tehran).
208. Id.; see generally S.E. RAYNER, THE THEORY OF CONTRACTS INISLAMIC LAW (1991).
209. See 31 C.F.R. § 560.523 (1999).
210. See Steve Liesman, Despite Sanctions, MOBIL, ARcO Signal Interest in Iran'sOil, Gas,
WALL ST. J. INT'L, Mar. 4, 1999, at A ll (discussing Mobil and ARCO's acquisition of geographical
data sets-quoting Mr. Lance Johnson, President, Mobil Exploration and Production Division:
"We're doing about anything we can within the guidelines. We're trying to have a profile that
positions us for when the sanctions are lifted.").
211. See id.
212. See CONOCO Applauds US. Decision to Waive Sanctions in TOTAL Deal, AGENCE
FRANCE-PRESSE, May 18, 1998 (recounting CONOCO President's view that companies should be
able to invest in the Iranian market).
213. See Country Report Iran 2nd Quarter 1998-Oil & Gas: MOBIL Pushesfor Swap Deal,
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with Iran under OFAC licensing arrangements. 1 4 Though OFAC has
denied further swap transactions, approved licenses for such arrangements
will remain a possible means of bypassing sanctions. 2"
For companies like MOBIL and CHEVRON that have significant
investments in the Caspian sector, OFAC licenses are vital to developing
foreign operations." 6 In the absence of alternative means of transportation
(e.g., pipelines) swap transactions present one of the few workable
methods for marketing Caspian resources to Western States.217 These
transactions also promote increased demand for a future Iranian
pipeline." 8
Swaps are called into question by 31 C.F.R. § 560.206 despite their
economic importance. 1 9 In the absence of OFAC approval, 31 C.F.R. §
560.206 prevents the exchange of Iranian goods-including refined oil.220
This forces a corporation to provide OFAC with an appropriate
justification for a swap transaction. Such a justification may or may not
pass muster depending on the political climate at the time submitted.221
One would expect that a company investing in the Caspian region
should be able to provide a valid swap justification given that a primary
security interests outlined by U.S.-Middle East policies calling for the
economic development of the Former Soviet States in the Caucasus
region.222 On the other hand, if the transaction is eclipsed by potential
Iranian-Caspian partnership dealings, OFAC is likely to consider the
justification unconvincing.223 Incidentally, OFAC has denied MOBIL'S
further swap requests.
In addition to licensed swap arrangements and intense planning efforts,
companies such as ARCO continue to voice their intention to bid for
limited exploration contracts in Iran.224 Such bidding may fall under the
$20 million threshold of ILSA provisions,225 but under the existing IEEPA
ECON. INTELLIGENCE UNIT LIMITED, May 20, 1998, at 26 [hereinafter Report] (describing Swap
transaction between MOBIL and Iran concerning Kazakh oil. MOBIL is seeking to expand swaps in
1999. A typical Swap would be 1-2 million barrels of unrefined oil for amount of refined oil in
equal value); see also Nanay, supra note 90, at 153-55 (discussing CHEVRON Swap arrangements).
214. See Report. supra note 213, at 26.
215. See id.
216. See Nanay, supra note 90; see generally Starr, supra note 67.
217. See id.
218. See 31 C.F.R. § 560.206 (1999).
219. See id.
220. See id.
221. See SIA I, supra note 144.
222. See STRATEGY, supra note 25.
223. See 31 C.F.R. § 560.303 (1999)(describing "Iranian" as any territory or marine area over
which Iran claims sovereign rights and where partial or total control receives benefit).
224. See Bids, supra note 200, at 16.
225. See id.; see also ILSA, supra note 12.
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$20 million threshold of ILSA provisions, 225 but under the existing IEEPA
regulatory scheme, contract performance is likely to violate 31 C.F.R. §
560.206.226 Even a foreign company with a U.S. subsidiary is prohibited
from selling American-made goods in the Iranian market. 227 Consequently,
companies considering limited Iranian investment offers risk criminal
penalties for intentionally violating U.S. sanctions regulations. 221 Smaller
U.S. companies may, however, stand a better chance of dodging sanctions
through merger or partnership arrangements.
3. Merger and Partnership Arrangements
Over the last two years, consolidation of businesses in the oil industry
has occurred at a rapid pace. 229 Numerous motivations exist for mergers
and strategic partnerships. These include opportunity for growth, larger
capitalization, technical specialization, market development, and leaner
operating costs. 23° Although not publicly 2stated,
sanctions in today's
3
market must also be a merger consideration. '
Mergers and strategic partnerships provide U.S. and foreign companies
with a potential solution to sanctions' negative market influences.
Although research does not indicate that any U.S. company has openly
announced its merger just to enter the Iranian market, the market climate
and demand for Middle East resources creates a strong stimulus for such
consideration. 232 Even for companies not initially seeking investment in
Iran, a transnational merger may create opportunities to exploit new
markets.
The recent merger of BRITISH PETROLEUM (BP) with AMOCO (with
further consideration to merge with ARCO) provides an example of how an
American company might utilize merger to escape U.S. sanctions.233 In the

225. See id; see also ILSA, supra note 12.
226. See 31 C.F.R. § 560.206 (1999).
227. See id.
228. See 50 U.S.C.A. § 1705(b) (West 1998). See generally 31 C.F.R. § 560 (1999).
229. See Bruisedbut Unbroken: How Oil and Gas CompaniesFought 1998 and Won, OIL &
GAS J., Jan. 4, 1999, at 18-23 (failing to discuss sanctions as a consideration for merger).
230. See e.g., Shell Reorganizes for Speed and Profit, OIL & GAS J., Dec. 21, 1998, at 31
[hereinafter Shell Reorganizes] (discussing SHELL's merger considerations).
231. See U.S. Mergers, Acquisitions Soar in 1998, OIL & GAS J., Jan. 4, 1999, at 23.
232. Experts often state that a company's size can impede the speed at which a company can
move into the Gulf market. A large company such as SHELL is likely to consider the benefits of
merging with a smaller company specialized in Middle East exploration, (e.g., ARCO), in order to
break into the Iranian market. Compare Campion Walsch, Exxon-Mobil/Persian Gulf-3:
CompetitionStill Intense, Dow Jones Telerate Energy Serv., Dec. 1, 1998, available in EN News
database, with Shell Reorganizes, supra note 230.
233. BP-AmOCO is headquartered in London, England, and it is generally considered that BP
absorbed Amoco during their recent merger. As a result, an issue remains as to whether or not U.S.
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BP merger, a U.S. subsidiary (AMOCO or ARCO) could actively invest in
Iran under the political shelter of a foreign company (BP). Comparatively,
CONOCO'S recent partnership initiatives provide an example of an
alternative business arrangement that could circumvent sanctions.234 In this
example, CONOCO, a U.S. corporation, could reap benefits from
transactions conducted primarily by its foreign partners (PETRONASSTATOIL). 235 The key issues appear to be timing and control. Specifically,
attention must be given to when the transaction is requested and how much
control the U.S. partner or subsidiary has in the investment.236
Where a merger results in the majority of equity being owned by the
foreign firm, the U.S. subsidiary's operations might fall outside the U.S.
jurisdictional requirement of 31 C.F.R. § 560. Additionally, the controlling
corporation could work a transfer of subsidiary assets or restructure its
operations in a manner that brings them under foreign control.23 7 In both
situations ILSA provisions would still apply, but the merger would create
a blanket of protection through foreign political pressures and foreign
blocking legislation.2 3' The shield of foreign political pressure might allow
a foreign corporate leadership to capitalize on a U.S. subsidiary's expertise

administrative agencies will treat AMOCO as a U.S. company for purposes of ILSA sanctions. Since
BP-AMOcO maintains approximately 50% of its assets in the United States it would still be subject
to thejurisdiction of OFAC proscriptions. CompareDavid B. Ottaway & Martha M. Hamilton, BPAmoco Seek to Drill in Iran; Firm Claims Waiverfor U.S. Sanctions,WASH. POST, Jan. 30, 1999,
at EOI [hereinafter Ottaway] (discussing BP-AmOCO proposal to develop three major oil fields in
southern Iran), with Big Oil gets Bigger TargetingReserves, MIDDLE E. ECON. DIG. Aug. 28, 1998,
at 2 [hereinafter Bigger] (discussing BP-AMOcO merger, noting AMOCO'S extensive involvement
in the Caspian and Middle East).
234. See Maureen Lorenzetti, Conoco Asks U.S. Okay to Run Iranian Crude, 76 PLATT'S
OILGRAM NEWS Apr 13, 1998, availablein 1998 WL 9827594 (discussing CONOCO-PETRONASSTATOIL (40%-45/6-1l5%) joint-venture partnership arrangement in Melaka-II, Malaysian oil

refinery project and CONOCO'S proposal to allow its partner PETRONAS to process Iranian heavy
crude). Experts assess that proposal will likely win approval from U.S. authorities. Id.
235. See id.
236. The Iran-Libya Sanctions Act makes a distinction between a "Person" and a "United
States Person." Under ILSA provisions a corporation is considered "foreign" if it is not organized
under the laws of the United States and U.S. persons do not own, directly or indirectly more than
50% of the outstanding capital stock or interest. See ILSA, supra note 12, § 14(7),(17). Foreign
corporations that merge with U.S. subsidiaries may be able to avoid ILSA sanctions if they can recharacterize operations as non-U.S. if the U.S. subsidiary maintains less than 50% of the
outstanding capital stock or if assets are moved outside U.S. jurisdiction. Still, evasion of Iranian
sanctions regulations is prohibited by 31 C.F.R. §§ 535.208, 560.203 and a U.S. subsidiary might
have a difficult time escaping the long arm of Federal Court "minimum contacts" jurisdiction. See
International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, (1945), and its progeny.
237. See ILSA, supra note 12, § 5.
238. See generally Rocky Mountain Paper 2A, supra note 186 (discussing Blocking
Legislation); Rocky Mountain Paper 2B, supra note 186 (discussing Blocking Legislation).
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to enter the Gulf market.239
Increased merger activity is heightening the complexity of the market
situation and making the political fallout of sanctions more costly for the
U.S. government. Smaller companies with less investment capital (e.g.,
AMoco) might be able to look to a larger corporation for the financial
backing necessary to break into a new market.24 ° In the event the
controlling corporation (e.g., BRITISH PETROLEUM (BP)) recharacterizes
its subsidiary operations, smaller investment opportunities could be
achieved that would otherwise be blocked by sanctions restrictions.24 '
Although foreign investments can not exceed ILSA's annual $20
million provision, smaller exploration contracts can help specialized
subsidiaries gain a foothold in the Iranian market.242 Such an advantage
is crucial to capturing a particular area of resource development (e.g.,
exploration or natural gas development).
A closer look at the BP-AMoco merger shows that the equity break-out
is BP 60%, AMOCO 40%.243 In this scenario, the U.S. firm, AMoco,
possesses excellent expertise in exploration and development in the
Middle East,244 while BP has been out of the Iranian market for many
years. 245 BRITISH PETROLEUM is thereby able to provide the foreign clout
necessary to combat sanctions while relying on the U.S. subsidiary's
business reputation for possible entry into a closed market. While the
subsidiary would still fall under the jurisdiction of OFAC regulations, the
U.S. government would be obligated to reconsider the political
ramifications of enforcement.2 46
If the political pressure is great enough, a U.S. subsidiary under foreign
control can avoid ILSA and IEEPA prohibitions altogether through
presidential waivers and/or OFAC licenses. Alternatively, the foreign
controlling corporation may take its chances with U.S. government

239. Incidentally the BP-AMOCO merger provides a good example of a subsidiary poised to
take advantage of the Iranian market. See AMOCO License Tops CaspianSea Action, OIL & GAS J.,
Jun. 29, 1998, at 34 (discussing AMoco's initiatives in the Caspian sea); see generallyalso Bigger,
supra note 233.
240. See

UNITED

NATIONS,

WORLD

INVESTMENT

REPORT

1997,

TRANSNATIONAL

CORPORATIONS, MARKET STRUCTURE AND COMPETITION POLICY 9 (1997) (noting that a primary
means of entering foreign markets is through cross-border merger).
241.

See Bigger, supra note 233, at 2.

242. See Farivar, supra note 193 (discussing ARCO'S interest in smaller "exploitation" projects
in Iran); see also Chmaytelli, supra note 194 (noting SYNTROLEUM CORP., a U.S. specialized
company in Liquefied Gas Technology (LGT), with interest in Iranian gas development).
243.
& GAS J.,
244.
245.
note 207,
246.

See Anne Rhodes & Patrick Crow, BP/AMoco Merger CreatesOil "Super-Major,"OIL
Aug. 17, 1998, at 34.
See Ottaway, supra note 233, at E01.
BP has been out ofthe Iranian market since Iran's 1979 Revolution. See McClellan, supra
at 4.
See Albright, supra note 164.
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enforcement by restructuring subsidiary operations and seeking
investments under $20 million. One concern, however, remains. Since
current U.S. regulations prohibit evasion of the Iranian sanctions,247 the
Federal Trade Commission of the U.S. Department of Commerce 24 might
choose not to approve an international merger if it is apparent that it is
designed for re-entry into the Iranian market.249 In such a situation, OFAC
interpretations could still upset an U.S. subsidiary's intentions for entry
into the Iranian market through a partnership or merger arrangement.
B. ForeignCorporateStrategies
"U.S. Companies are going to be way behind ....
1. Strategic Partnerships
Foreign firms have been less affected by U.S. sanctions than their
American counterparts. They have primarily relied on strategic
partnerships to gain control over Iranian business offerings. 251' After
CONOCO backed out of its initial contract, TOTAL SA of France stepped
into its place. 25 2 Riding the anti-sanctions tide, TOTAL SA formed a
strategic partnership with GAZPROM of Russia, and PETRONAS of Malaysia
to gain a second major natural gas development contract.253 This
partnership arrangement forced the United States government to reexamine
sanctioning an action that might hinder trade relations in three major
trading areas of the world: Europe, Russia, and Asia.254

247. See 31 C.F.R. § 560.203 (1999) (prohibiting any transaction by any U.S. person that has
the purpose of evading any of the sanctions regulations).
248. See id. § 560.203.
249. Compare id. § 560.203, with Burrell, supra note 232. The Department of Treasury
routinely coordinates with the Department of State and the Department of Commerce to enforce
sanctions. Confirmed by Author in personal conversation with OFAC representatives, Jul. 22, 1999.
250. See Daniel Southerland, Over a Barrel in Iraq? Clinton PolicySidelines US. Firms in

the Rush for Rights to Tap 'Super-Giant' Field, WASH. POST, May 7, 1995, at HOI (quoting
Lawrence Goldstein, President of Petroleum Industry Research Foundation, describing the effect
of U.S.-Iraqi sanctions on U.S. companies). Although the topic differs, the situation is both
analogous and aptly prescient of the current situation regarding U.S. Iranian sanctions.
251. Of the three most recent contracts signed between Western energy corporations and Iran,
all are partnership arrangements: TOTAL-PETRONAS-GAZPROM (South Pars Gas Fields); Bow
VALLEY-ELF (Balal Oil Field); ELF-AGIP (Dorood Oil Field).
252. See Pelletreau, supranote 9, at 24.
253. See id.
254. See id. at 25.
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Merger
EXXON

+

MOBIL

Table 2 - Mergers & Acquisitions (Sanctions/Energy Related)
Gulf/Iran
Status
Africa
EXXON
MOBIL
Complete

ROYAL DUTCH]SHELL

Complete

BP + AMOCO + ARCO

ARCO - Review

AMOCO

BP+ARcO

TOTAL/PETROFINA SA + ELF

ELF- Review

ELF

TOTAL/SA + ELF

TEXACO (CHEVRON)

CHEVRON (TExACO)

Contemplated
Contemplated

CONOCO

Possible Target

CONOCO

Bow VALLEY

Wild Cat

Bow VALLEY

RANGER

Wild Cat

RANGER

BAKRIE

Wild Cat

BAKRIE

PETRONAS (Partnership w/ CONOCO)

Wild Cat

PETRONAS

STATOIL

Wild Cat

STATOIL

Caspian
MOBIL

SHELL

BP + AMOCO

CHEVRON

Note: Information is not comprehensive and is intended to depict only the most prominent corporate activity.
Legend: (Italics = Interest Shown) (CAPS = Ongoing Activity) (Wild Cat = Single or Partnership Activity)

In hindsight, TOTAL SA's move was ingenious.255 Forming a strategic
partnership offers a way to spread the capital, economic, and political risks.
of reentry into an uncertain market. But such a move has drawbacks. Since
one of OFAC's primary tools for enforcement is financial asset blocking,
mergers create difficulties in acquiring the funding and insurance
necessary to complete a large-scale energy agreement.25 6 American
banking-institutions are often the only institutions large enough and strong
enough to bear greater risk at better terms.257 These U.S. institutions are
subject, however, to 31 C.F.R. § 560.206 procedures.25 8 As OFAC's
constructive agent, they can stop a deal cold.259
An example of such difficulty appears in the Canadian company Bow
VALLEY'S bid for development of the Balal Oil Field.26 ° Outbidding
competitors for the contract over a year ago, Bow VALLEY has only
recently been able to close its deal after losing its initial partners-BAKRIE
of Indonesia and BRITISH PETROLEUM of England-to financial and

255. See generally id.
256. See Christophe de Roquefeuil, France's ELi, Canada's Bow VALLEY Sign Iranian Oil

Deal, AGENCE FRANCE-PRESSE, Apr. 4, 1999 (indicating that Bow VALLEY'S second partner to the
Balal Oil Field contract, PREMIER of U.K. backed out as a result of financial difficulties).
257. See Kielmas, supra note 114 (indicating that major European creditors can not cover the
risks of major Iranian oil development offers).
258. See 31 C.F.R. § 560.206 (prohibiting financing for Iranian oil development transactions).
259. See id.
260. See Roquefeuil, supra note 256.
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political pressures.26 ' Despite such difficulties, strategic partnerships are
still the preferred method for foreign firms seeking to beat U.S. sanctions.
2. Subsidiary Asset Sales
Strategic partnerships offer additional political cover for foreign
corporations seeking entry into the Iranian market, but they do not provide
full protection from sanctions. For those companies subject to U.S.
jurisdiction and/or those that violate the $20 million investment provision
of ILSA, sanctions can prove disruptive to profitable export operations or
financial transactions. As such, a foreign company has two choices. It can
remain below ILSA's investment limits, or it can opt to sell off those
assets and subsidiaries in the United States that could possibly subject it
to 31 C.F.R. § 560 prohibitions.262
This ruse is not farfetched. After TOTAL SA acquired CONOCO's lost
contract, it moved in on an even larger deal for development of the South
Pars Gas Fields estimated at $2 billion USD.263 In order to shelter itself
from political recoil, it sold its assets and subsidiaries in the United States
while bidding for South Pars. 2" Certainly this option is available only to
those corporations that stand to gain more from a sanctioned market than
a stateside market. Arguably for TOTAL SA the gambit paid off.
Taking advantage of the first major Iranian contract opportunity put
TOTAL SA out front. It was able to gain valuable experience and
knowledge of the current Iranian market. Another major French company,
ELF, has already capitalized on French contacts in the region.265 It has
acquired a billion-dollar contract for the Daroud oil field in Iran.26
Together these French companies have managed to increase the ante on
U.S. sanctions. They have strengthened their commercial stance through
the prospects of a merger and gained stronger market control over the
Iranian energy sector.2 67 Their actions have created an incentive for the
French government to institute protective blocking legislation.

261. See id.; see also House Hearings, supra note 31 (testimony of Stuart Eizenstaat)
(indicating that the United States pressured BOW VALLEY'S initial partner BAKRIE to back out of
its partnership arrangement and that BAKRIE was also limited due to the Asian financial crisis).
262. Compare 31 C.F.R. § 560, with ILSA, supra note 12.
263. See Pelletreau, supra note 9, at 24.
264. See id. TOTAL SA sold all its facilities and operations in the United States to ULTRAMAR
DIAMOND SHAMROCK CORPORATION before entering a second agreement with Iran for South Pars
Gas Fields development.
265. See Oil: E.1; Doubles Activities in Iran-Abstract, LES ECHOS, reprinted in WORLD
REPORTER, Apr. 6, 1999.
266. See ELF-A Un' Sign Dorood Contractwith Iran, OIL & GAS J., Mar. 8, 1999, at 31.
267. See Thomas Kamm, et al., Target Calls Bid Hostile; Takeover WouldCreate Biggest
Firm in France,WALL ST. J., July 6, 1999, at A3 (discussing TOTAL-ELF merger).
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3. Reliance on Foreign Blocking Legislation
Strategic partnerships and asset sales provide the shield for foreign
firms seeking entry into the Iranian market, but blocking legislation
provides the sword. In countries like Canada where blocking legislation
exists, smaller companies, such as Bow VALLEY, are able to strike out for
Iranian bids under the cover of government protection.268 Since the United
States has already set a waiver precedent, more foreign bidders are likely
to go it alone.
Blocking legislation provides a significant deterrent against U.S.
sanctions. By challenging U.S. credibility, it allows a foreign corporation
to put state sovereignty on the line before its own financial assets are
threatened. With the Clinton administration facing a host of criticism over
its unilateral trade initiatives, and a presidential "lame-duck" period
pressure countries into a
approaching, the United States is not likely to
2 69
lost.
be
could
capital
political
where
situation
Foreign blocking legislation has thus rung the death knell for the
extraterritorial application of unilateral U.S.-Iranian sanctions.27° The U.S.
government's 1998 waivers show that on a foreign policy level, the United
States is not willing to face a challenge over unilateral sanctions before an
international tribunal. As such, few cases involving foreign firms are ever
likely to reach the judiciary. Bottomline: U.S.-Iranian sanctions are
unlikely to deter the burgeoning of foreign investment in the Iranian
energy field.

268. See generally Rocky Mountain Paper 2A; supra note 186; Rocky Mountain Paper 2B,
supra note 186.
269. Interestingly, the Executive Branch has stated that the basis for its waiver is that
European countries are cooperating with the United States in efforts to curb Iranian support for
terrorist activities and acquisition of WMD technology. Yet, in issuing its waiver, the President did
so under ILSA Section 9C not Section 4C. Ostensibly this choice was made to avoid answering
questions regarding the extent of foreign cooperation on Iranian issues. A 9C waiver is issued if the
President makes a determination that such a waiver is in the national interest, while a 4C waiver
requires a foreign country to establish specific sanctioning procedures. Compare Albright, supra
note 164, with ILSA, supra note 12, §§ 4(c), 9(c).
270. See Rocky Mountain Paper 2A, supra note 186.
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VII. JUDICIAL REVIEW OF U.S.-IRANIAN SANCTIONS

"The obvious purpose of27the order is to isolate Iran from trade
with the United States. '
Unlike the Internal Revenue Service (IRS), OFAC does not customarily
release public records of its private rulings. 272 Aside from Freedom-ofInformation Act requests, litigated cases and OFAC publications are the
only means for determining OFAC positions. Since no foreign government
has challenged U.S. sanctions at the international level, there are no
pertinent transnational cases to evaluate. Federal rulings have, however,
established the validity of similar sanctions activity within U.S.
jurisdiction.273
Even though ILSA provisions remain questionable under international
law, challenges to Iranian Assets Control and Transaction Regulations are
likely to fall on deaf ears in federal courts.274 The judiciary is not likely to
grant recourse for U.S.-Iranian sanctions, and will respond with rulings
similar to those made on complaints over Cuban asset blocking. There is,
however a unique difference between Iranian sanctions and other sanctions
regulations.
In contrast to earlier sanctions, the United States Congress passed ILSA
with the intent to apply its provisions extraterritorially.275 Unlike the policy
implementations towards Cuba and Iraq, there was no visible "triggering
event" that motivated the U.S. government's action (e.g., nationalization
of assets or invasion of a sovereign country).276 Moreover, there was no
multi-lateral or bilateral support for ILSA.277 The lack of grounding for
such legal measures thus proves to be a shaky foundation for
extraterritorial application of ILSA. Courts have shown, however, that it
does not provide a sufficient basis for defeating individual sanctions
charges within the federal judiciary. For those under U.S. jurisdiction,
sanctions present a significant courtroom threat. Any challenge rooted in

271. United States v. Ehsan, 163 F.3d 855, 859 (4th Cir. 1998).
272. See id.
273. See generallyDames& Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654(1981)(holding that the Executive
Branch has wide authority under IEEPA regulations so long as it has "implicit approval" from
Congress).
274. See generally id.
275. See Senate Hearings,supra note 183 (indicating that the sanctions were passed to "set
an example" for other nations to follow).
276. See id.
277. See ILSA, supra note 12, § 4 (requiring the President to attempt establishment of a multilateral sanctions regime against Iran upon ILSA's enactment).
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claims of ambiguity risks criminal liability.
The only documented case concerning Iranian sanctions appears to be
United States v. Ehsan,2 7' a case where the defendant was indicted for
shipping equipment in violation of export prohibitions.2 79 The defendant
attempted to ship Transformer Oil Gas Analysis Systems (TOGAS)
through a third country, the United Arab Emirates, into Iran.2" ° Ehsan
argued that federal regulations did not cover "reexportation" and that 31
C.F.R. § 560 was ambiguous."'
At the time of Ehsan's offense, between May 95 and May 96, IEEPA
regulations did not specifically address reexportation.282 It was not until
President Clinton issued Executive Order 13,059 clarifying Executive
Orders 12,957 and 12,959 that "reexportation" was specifically addressed
in 31 C.F.R. § 560.283 The District Court and the Fourth Circuit Court of
Appeals weighted this distinction differently.
The District Court favored Ehsan and took a strict textual approach to
interpreting export regulations. 2 Taking a different approach, the Fourth
Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the District Court.285 The Appellate
Court stated that a broad interpretation of Executive Orders and their
ensuing regulations was warranted in order to effectuate the President's
intent to ban all exports to Iran.286 This ruling is not unusual. The judiciary
often gives wide discretion to the actions of the Executive Branch in the
area of foreign affairs.28 7
Although no further cases are on record concerning U.S.-Iranian
sanctions, one can look by analogy to outside rulings-specifically those
involving U.S.-Iraqi sanctions-to glean a further impression of future
judicial outcomes under IEEPA regulations. One need investigate few
additional cases, however, to see that the judiciary will give the Executive
Branch wide latitude in implementing sanctions provisions.
In United States v. Arch Trading Co.,288 the defendant was convicted
of conspiring to commit an offense against the United States, violating
29
IEEPA regulations, and lying to the Office of Foreign Assets Control.

278. 163 F.3d 855 (4th Cir. 1998).
279. Id. at 857.
280. Id.
281. Id.
282. See id. at 857, 859.
283. See id.
284. See id. at 857.
285. Id. at 860.
286. See id. at 859. The Court noted that "[tihe obvious purpose of the order is to isolate Iran
from trade with the United States." Id.
287. See HENKIN, supra note 124, at 131-48 (discussing the courts in foreign affairs matters).
288. 987 F.2d 1087 (4th Cir. 1993).
289. Id. at 1090.
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These charges arose from a prohibited agreement between Arch Trading
and an Iraqi government instrumentality. 290 Arch Trading ultimately lost,
but it posited a number of clever arguments before the court.29 '
Arch Trading's argument had three prongs: 1) a violation of an
Executive Order could not constitute a conspiracy offense, 2) the President
had no authority to define criminal conduct under IEEPA regulations, and
3) the Executive Orders were inconsistent.292 On each of these arguments
the court ruled against Arch Trading, 293 and deferred to Executive
discretion. The judiciary simply refused to encroach on the President's
authority to issue sanctions.294
A cursory analysis of the Ehsan and Arch Tradingholdings shows that
the Fourth Circuit is willing to yield to the executive and legislative
branches when interpreting IEEPA and NEA regulations. Future cases
regarding enforcement of asset blocking are likely to have similar
results.295 Corporations considering current investments in Iran must
realize that testing the limits of U.S.-Iranian sanctions is hazardous.2 96
Although there may be commercial policy reasons to rule in favor of a
defendant,297 the courts are still likely to interpret sanctions prohibitions
broadly. This is likely to be the case regardless of what Federal Circuit
reviews the issues. Thus legal scholars and corporate practitioners are
better off not second-guessing the Executive Branch when it comes to
sanctions authority.
Corporate directors and their legal advisors must also realize that
OFAC has established a certain "minimum standard" for dealing with
sanctions prohibitions.298 The Office of Foreign Assets Control provides
computer software, prohibited party listings, and recommended procedures

290. See id.
291. See id. at 1090-96.
292. See id.
293. See id.
294. See id.
295. See, e.g., Consarc Corp. v. United States Treasury Dep't, 71 F.3d 909,315 U.S. 201 App.
D.C. 201 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (holding that OFAC's asset blocking and fund freezing under Iraqi
sanctions regulations was permissible and granting wide latitude to the Executive Branch in
enforcement measures).
296. Case analysis refutes any argument that ILSA can be interpreted with ambiguity. See
Zedalis, supra note 159, at 542 (making a narrow textual argument that some petroleum services
may not fall under the "ambit" of ILSA).
297. Commercial policy reasons for not enforcing U.S.-lranian sanctions might include claims
that U.S. subsidiaries have only limited control over foreign partnership arrangements and therefore
should not be subjected unfairly to domestic political constraints.
298. See OFAC-Frequently Asked Questions (FAQ's) (visited Apr. 26, 1999)
<http://www.ustreas.gov/ofac/tliran.pdf> (suggesting each financial institution designate an OFAC
compliance representative and that each institution must check every financial transaction against
OFAC list of prohibited companies).
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for determining what financial transactions might be subject to
government regulations.2 In addition to its products, OFAC recommends
that a corporation designate an OFAC representative.3"' In this way,
corporations are charged with a certain duty of care.3 ' A court could
arguably apply such a standard under 50 U.S.C.A. § 1703(b) and 31 C.F.R.
§ 560 when evaluating a transaction that benefits an Iranian third party.
VIII. THE IRANIAN COUNTER-TRADE MODEL

"The more open and transparent investments are' the more
chances we have in solving economic problems." 302
A. Swaps and Buy-Backs
Some companies have been able to lessen the effectiveness of sanctions
through direct investment agreements. Additionally, Iran's counter-trade
model has caught on and Iraq is already planning to follow Iran's buy-back
approach.30 3 It is therefore prudent to examine the current energy contracts
Iran is placing for bid. Such agreements are primarily counter-trade
agreements that include both swaps and buy-backs. 3° Since developing
countries have historically avoided giving official status to such countertrade transactions, long-term international counter-trade transactions have
typically been rare.30 5 Iran's systematic approach toward making such
public offers appears to be setting a trend.3°
Swaps are simply commodity exchange agreements.30 7 In the Iranian
energy sector swaps are similar to that which MOBIL arranged for-an
exchange in unrefined Caspian oil for refined Iranian oil in the Gulf.30 .
299. See id.
300. See id.
301. See id.
302. Mehrdad Balali, Khatami Seeks Supportfor Iran Investment, REUTERS, Aug. 28, 1999,
(visited 8 Sept. 99) <http://www.iraniantrade.org/_NewsUpdates/0000029e.html> (quoting Iranian
President Mohammad Khatami).
303. See Specialized Financing: Iraq to Mirror Iran Financing Method, PROJECT & TRADE
FIN., July 1, 1997, at 19.
304. For an excellent case-book analyzing energy contract formation, clauses, and an overview
of transaction types see ERNEST E. SMITH, et al., INTERNATIONAL PETROLEUM TRANSACTIONS 358,
667 (1993); see, e.g., Buy-Back, supra note 115; Nanay, supra note 90.
305. See OECD, COUNTERTRADE- DEVELOPING COUNTRY PRACTICES 14(1985).
306. See id. at 14, 26.
307. See Cedric Guyot, Countertradein InternationBusiness,20 INT'L LAW 921, 925 (1986).
Swaps are simply non-currency barter transactions. See id. (describing in detail various countertrade transactions).
308. See Report, supra note 213 (noting that MOBIL is seeking to expand Swap deals with Iran
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Another example would be the CONOCO partnership arrangement, where
the foreign partner PETRONAS sought to provide refining services in
exchange for Iranian crude."°
Buy-backs, in contrast, are often long-term investment agreements
providing the exchange of goods or services between parties usually with
no monetary exchange."' These arrangements are uniquely tailored to a
particular situation.31' In the Iranian energy sector, buy-back contracts are
based on the exchange of investment in resource development services for
repayment in oil production at a set percentage rate between fifteen to
twenty percent upon contract completion.'
Developing countries have historically offered such counter-trade
models in an effort to attract capital investment and needed goods during
time periods of financial difficulty."' Buy-back contracts have been a
favorite of China, particularly in efforts to attract high technology
investments. 14 They were also preferred transactions for the governments
of the Former U.S.S.R. and Eastern Europe.315 Surprisingly buy-backs
have fallen from favor as a topic of interest in recent literature.3 16 Still,
they are no less important to the policies of today's developing countries
than they were in the past. Western petroleum investors should, therefore,
understand the Iranian counter-trade model in order to limit the risks of
reentry into the Iranian market.
Iran has utilized modem buy-back contract models since the early
1980S. 3 17 Although there is little documentation on the details of these
contracts, Iran appears to have frequently relied on counter-trade policies
during periods of oil price decline and financial difficulty.318 One of the
largest of these contracts included a $1.1 billion exchange of oil to
Romania for locomotives, tractors, oil equipment, spare parts and
consultancy services. 319 Other publicly-documented transactions included
in 1999).
309. See Lorenzetti, supra note 234 (discussing CONOCO-PETRONAS-STATOIL (40/o-45%15%) joint-venture partnership arrangement in Melaka-il, Malaysian oil refinery project and
CONOCO's proposal to allow its partner PETRONAS to process Iranian heavy crude-experts assess
that proposal will likely win approval from U.S. authorities).
310. See Guyot, supra note 307, at 948.
311.
312.
313.
314.
315.

See DICK FRANCIS, COUNTERTRADE HANDBOOK 30-31 (1987).
See Bahree 1I, supra note 118.
See Guyot, supra note 307, at 921-22.
See id. at955.
See FRANCIS, supra note 311, at 30.

316. See generally SHEILA PAGE, How DEVELOPING COUNTRIES TRADE-THE INSTITUTIONAL

CONSTRAINTS 69 (1994) (discussing historical views of counter-trade and citing a total of 215
documented counter-trade transactions in the Middle East between 1980-1987).
317. See OECD, supra note 305, at 34-35.
318. See FRANCIS, supra note 311, at 193.
319. See OECD, supra note 305, at 34-35.
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exchanges of oil for foodstuffs and technology with New Zealand,
Uruguay, Thailand, China, and Japan.32° Iranian counter-trade transactions
have typically involved high dollar values, well above $500 million.32 '
High-dollar Iranian counter-trade offers continue to be today's market
trend.322
Although the Iranian government abandoned its barter policy in mid1982,323 it has since reinstated administrative counter-trade regulations.324
In 1991, the Iranian parliament approved the current buy-back model.325
This buy-back model permits Western oil companies to enter into state
energy development projects.326 The Iranian Bilateral Transactions
Committee of the Ministry of Commerce and the relevant division of the
National Iranian Oil Company oversee all Iranian barter deals. 327 These
offers allow Iran to negotiate each deal separately.3 2 Since buy-back
agreements are considered the law between the parties, they are wellsuited to Iran's religiously-based legal system. They allow Iran to maintain
sovereignty over its resources while making special accommodations for
foreign investment.329
Iran's current focus on counter-trade is likely due to its rising domestic
energy demands,330 declining oil prices,33' poor economic state, 332
334
government deficit, 333 and tattered energy production infrastructure.
While neighboring Gulf states have much more competitive Gross
Domestic Product (GDP) rates, Iran's economy is in need of
320. See id.
321. See id. (describing exchange between Iran-New Zealand £84 million; exchange between
Iran-China $500 million USD; exchange between Iran-Brazil $400 million; exchange between IranJapan $770 million; exchanges documented between 1981-1983 and included exchange of oil for
commodities, services, products, and foodstuffs).
322. See, e.g., Bahree If, supra note 118.
323. See OECD., supra note 305, at 32.
324. See Buy-Back, supra note 115.
325. See id.
326. See id.
327. Iran's SUPREME ECONOMIC COUNCIL must approve current foreign contracts. See Francis,
supranote 311, at 193; see also Bhushan Bahree, Iran, in Blow to US. Sanctions,Advances ELFENI Qilfield Deal, WALL ST. J. INT'L, Feb. 18, 1999, at A17 [hereinafter Bahree 111].
328. See Guyot, supra note 307, at 948.
329. See WALLED EL-MALIK, MINERALS INVESTMENT UNDER THE SHARI'A LAW 9 (1993).
330. See IranSurvey: HardTimes, How Not to AttractInvestment, ECONOMIST, Jan. 18, 1997.

331. Worldwide concern over oil-price declines has been well documented in recent
periodicals. See e.g., The Next Shock?, ECONOMIST, Mar. 6, 1999, at 23 [hereinafter Shock].
332.

WORLD BANK, GLOBAL ECONOMIC PROSPECTS AND THE DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 77-

78(1996) (citing Iran's GDP Growth rate for 1994 at a dismal -0.1% and a rising inflation rate at

35.4%).
333. See Tightrope, supra note 120, (citing the Iranian's $6 Billion USD government deficit
through Mar. 21, 1999).
334. See Rathnell, supra note 35, at 411-12.
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revitalization.335 Buy-backs permit Iran to gain foreign direct investment
and technology without losing control over its constitutionally protected
natural resources.336 They also provide Iran with a possible means of
avoiding OPEC production quota requirements. 337Payment in oil arguably
does not fall under the category of sales on the open market.
Although OPEC countries have recently cut production, 338 Iranian
concerns over a flooded market still provide an impetus for the increase in
development offerings.339 Not only is Iran hoping to take advantage of3its
4
low cost of production to increase cash flow under depressed oil prices, 1
but it is strategically positioning itself to meet future contingencies. 341 As
pressure builds to bring Iraqi and Libyan oil back on the market, 342 there
will be tension on countries to undercut OPEC requirements.3 43 In order to
maintain stable export profits and government revenue, Iran must have the
ability to increase production in order to capture market shares in the event
oil prices again plummet.
B. Counter-TradeRisks
Some commentators have erroneously described Iran's energy offers
as "relatively risk free."34" As advantageous as counter-trade transactions

335., See Tightrope, supra note 120.
336. See SCHIRAZI, supra note 113, at 23.
337. Compare Bruce Stanley, Oil Ministers Target Production Cuts, BRYAN-COLLEGE
STATION EAGLE, Mar. 21, 1999, at A6, with Steve Liesman, et al., Crude Cuts: Will Oil Nations
Stick or Stray?, WALL ST. J.,Mar. 26, 1999, at A19, andSteve Liesman, et al., Oil Producers'Pact
to Slash Supplies is Unlikely to Succeed, Skeptics Contend, WALL ST. J., Mar. 15, 1999, at A3
(discussing the likelihood that increased oil prices and economic difficulties will encourage OPEC
members to violate newly set production cuts).
338. See Stanley, supra note 337, at 46.
339. Saudi consideration of increased production and Iraq's desire to expand exports will
result in an even stronger impetus for OPEC members to cheat on production quotas, resulting in
the possibility of a flooded oil market. See Aramco Self-Sufficient, GULF STATES NEWS., Feb. 19,
1999, at I (discussing Crown Prince Abdullah's suggestion in 1998 that the Saudi oil sector could
be open to participation by foreign oil companies); see also A.F. Alhajji, Why Do Some OPEC
Members Cheat?, 23 J. ENERGY & DEV. 59 (1998) (noting that the real value of oil drops for
countries such as the UAE when OPEC cuts production).
340. Depressed oil prices have pushed Iran deeper into recession and resulted in a near
collapse of Iran's currency, the Rial. See Iran: Survival, Against the Odds, ECONOMIST, Feb. 6,
1999, at 48.
341. See id.
342. See, e.g., Fadhil J.Chalabi, Iraq'sOil: The Economic & PoliticalConstraints, 18 MIDDLE
EAST EXEC. REP.'9 (1995); see also, e.g., Libya: Energy Sector Opens up to Foreign Investment,
MIDDLE EAST ECON. DIG. (Apr. 30, 1999).
343. See Alhaji, supra note 339, at 59.
344. Recent press reports ironically call Iranian contracts "risk free." See, e.g., Bahree I, supra
note 1.

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/fjil/vol12/iss2/3

42

INVESTMENT IN IRAN

McCary: End Run on Sanctions: A Case Study on Contemporary Energy Investm

in
are for Iran, they still present risk for the Western investor. 345 Investing 346
investment.
capital
of
degree
high
a
requires
contracts
Iranian energy
Unlike the advantageous percentage-cut offered under Production Sharing
Agreement (PSA), buy-backs are set for a fixed amount of return.347 Oil
price changes, and Iranian production difficulties therefore limit the return
on Western investments. Even though Iran offers its buy-backs at
relatively high rates-fifteen to twenty percent-increased domestic demand
difficulties could prevent its timely repayment of investment
or production
8
costs.

34

In the event a major OPEC player such as Saudi Arabia "opens the
taps, 349 Iran will have difficulty maintaining hard currency reserves. It
will be forced to use its production to pay the high rates of return on its
buy-backs while satisfying domestic demands. A major fluctuation in oil
prices could thus place greater pressure on Iran to increase its production
to capacity. With its infrastructure in shambles, a flooded market might
again lead to the nationalization of foreign assets, or sequestration of
investment technology. 350 Additionally, the all-too-familiar political and
military tensions3 1in the Gulf region could result in embargo penalties, or
investment loss. '
The possibility of these events occurring presents a significant risk of
contract cancellation or non-performance under an Iranian buy-back

345. See id.
346. See id.
347. See Buy-Back, supra note 115.
348. See id.; see also Bahree II, supra note 118.
349. See Shock, supra note 331, at 24 (displaying cover "Drowning in Oil" and discussing the
possibility of a flooded petroleum market).
350. Prior to the Iranian Revolution, Iran implemented provisions to safeguard its natural
resources from domestic corruption and foreign manipulation. Despite the protections offered to
foreign investors under its initial Petroleum Legislation, the Iranian revolution led to the
nationalization of foreign investment assets. CompareRouholla K. Ramazani, Oil andLaw in Iran,
Vol. II, No. 2 J. OF JOHN BASSETT MOORE Soc'Y INT'L L. 56-69 (1962) (later renamed VA INT'L
L.J.) (discussing background information on the legal environment controlling early Iranian energy
contracts) with Rhodes, supranote 198 (describing modem day legal protections under Iran's Law
for Attraction and Protection of Foreign Investments).
351. The United States has deployed military forces to the Gulf more often than in any other
area of the world since Operation DESERT STORM ended in 1991. Military standoffs over continued
Iraqi aggression have resulted in major deployments of U.S. forces in recent years. Although U.S.
air strikes have become the norm, these deployments and their ensuing operations could potentially
disrupt oil development projects in the region. Compare STRATEGY, supra note 25 (noting high
deployment rates to the Gulf), with Alan Cooperman, et al., Rolling Up in Iraq, U.S. NEWS, Sept.
23, 1996 (discussing deployment under Operation DESERT STRIKE) PipelineAttack Renews Drive
for Policy Change (Iraqi Oil Exports), OIL DAILY, Mar. 23, 1999 (discussing U.S. air-strikes and
terrorist bombing damaging Iraqi-Turkish oil pipeline), Why the Bombs are Falling on Iraq,
ECONOMIST, Mar. 6, 1999, at 42 (discussing recent U.S./U.K. air strikes in response to Iraqi
aggression), and Richard Newman, Bombs over Baghdad,U.S. NEWs, Jan. 4, 1999.
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agreement. This risk underscores the difficulties major multi-nationals are
having in obtaining both insurance and financial backing for major
investments in the Iranian energy sector.3"2 Iranian reliance on arguments
of changed circumstances or ForceMajeur, probably would not hold up
before an international tribunal, but litigating/resolving the issues would
be both time-consuming and costly.353 Corporations must therefore be
vigilant. Although lawyers working on Iranian buy-back deals have room
to be creative,' they must cautiously ensure contract clauses provide a
minimum of adequate protection for multi-million dollar investments.
IX.

CONTEMPORARY WESTERN-IRANIAN CONTRACT ANALYSIS

"We were very glad to hear the speech of President Khatami
in which he mentioned that Iran wants to move towards a free
market economy....
A. Current Western-IranianEnergy Contracts
Although business confidentiality rules prevent the review of actual
Iranian buy-back contracts,35 6 Barrows Corporation of New York has
produced synopses of the major clauses in TOTAL SA's buy-back deal for
the Sirri Gas Fields, and Bow VALLEY'S buy-back agreement for
development of the Balal Oil Fields. 3 7 Certain events have forced
partnerships to change, but evaluation of these products provides insight
into future Iranian business offers.
Analysis of current agreements indicates that corporations are
sacrificing contractual protection in an effort to reenter the Iranian market.
They also indicate Iran's desire to protect its own market in the face of
Western development.
352. See Kielmas, supra note 114.
353. See Lawrence W. Newman, A Personal History of Claims Arising Out of the Iranian
Revolution, 27 NYU J.INT'L L. & POL. 631 (1995) (describing the successes of the U.S.-Iranian
Claims Tribunal, but noting the lengthy time of the dispute resolution process).
354. See Guyot, supra note 307, at 948.
355. See Al- Wazzan Visit Successful: Kuwait HailsIran Reforms, KUWAITTMES, Oct. 5, 1999
(quoting Kuwaiti Minister of Commerce, Abdulwahhab AI-Wazzan).
356. The author requested copies of actual Western-Iranian investment contracts from multiple
organizations including, CONOCO, the U.S. State Department, and the U.S. Treasury Department.
These were not released, however, for reasons of business confidentiality and corporate value.
357. The author personally contacted BARROWS to receive Sirri Gas and Balal Oil contract
synopses. These are reprinted in BARROWS COMPANY PETROLEUM CONCESSIONS HANDOOK (1999),
available by purchase at the BARROWS INTERNET WEBSITE (visited Apr. 27, 1999)
<http://www.barrows-company.com> [hereinafter BARROWS CONTRACT SYNOPSES]. Contract
synopses also on hand with the FLA. J. INT'L L.
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The major contracts signed with Iran are displayed in Diagram 3:

Table 3: Contemporary Iranian Investment Contracts (1995-1999)
Primary Agent

Partnerships

Contract Details

Status

Total SA (France)35"'

Took CONOCO Contract

Sirri Gas Fields, Iran
Signed: October, 1997
National Iranian Oil Co.

U.S. Waiver Granted

$700 Mil USD, Time
Unknown
TOTAL SA (FRANCE) 3 9
Split: TOTAL - 40%
GAZPROM - 30%

GAZPROM (RusSIA)

South Pars Gas Fields, Iran

PETRONAS (MALAYSIA)

Signed: October, 1997
National Iranian Oil Co.
$2 Bil USD, Time Unknown
Est. Ret. Unknown

PETRONAS - 30%

U.S. Waiver Granted

Bow VALLEY (CANADA)
Split: Bow- 15%
ELF - 85%

PE.h

,.,im.m
B
.I ,,fE.ft4,eNE*9e
PftmZR
:(UK)",
..
RI.II PETRL (UK)
ELF (FRANCE)

Balal Oil Field, Iran
Signed: April, 1999
National Iranian Oil Co.
$169 Mil USD, 6 Yrs
Est. Ret. 18/., $278 Mil

U.S. Review Pending

ELF (FRANCE)3 63
Split: ELF- 55%
AGIP- 45%

AGIP

Dorood Oil Field, Iran
Signed: March, 1999
National Iranian Oil Co.
$540 Mil USD, 10 Yrs

U.S. Review Pending

(ITALY)

Est. Ret. Unknown

These contracts are tailored to individual party desires, but one can
expect that the combined interests of the Iranian government and multinational corporations will result in some similarities in contractual
provisions.

358. See Tightrope, note 120 (discussing TOTAL SA's contract for offshore Sirri Fields A and
E).
359. TOTAL SA's Sirri and South Pars contracts are often confused in press releases. See
Hillary Durgin, Iran Stays Closed to U.S. Companies/ Policy Opens Doorfor Foreign Oil Firms,
HOUSTON CHRON., May 19, 1998, at PI (distinguishing between TOTAL SA's separate Sirri &
South Pars contracts).
360. See Tightrope, note 120 (discussing Bow VALLEY'S difficulties in sealing deal with its
original partner PELL FRISHMAN, a U.K. engineering firm).
361. See House Hearings, supra note 31 (testimony of Stuart E. Eizenstat, alluding to U.S.
State Department's success in pressuring BAKRIE to back out of partnership arrangement).
362. See Dow TELERATE 1, supra note 157.
363. See EL.l.; AmIi' Sign Dorood Contract with Iran, OIL & GAS J., Mar. 8, 1999, at 31
(discussing Dorood contract).
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B. Evaluation of ContemporaryIranianContractClauses
Common to both the TOTAL SA and Bow VALLEY agreements are a
number of clauses that warrant review.3" These include choice-of-law,
arbitration, termination and Force Majeur, method-of-payment,
participation and management, and assignment clauses. Each contract
specifies that the terms of agreement are between the Western corporation
and the National Iranian Oil Company (NIOC).36 5
Choice-of-Law Clause: Most visible in these agreements is a choice-oflaw clause specifying that Iranian law governs the contracts. 3 In the event
of a dispute, this clause may prevent Western companies from being able
to recover fully for their investment. Although principles of
commercialism-Lex Mercatoria-have become more frequent in
international tribunal rulings,36 7 there is no guarantee that they would be
applied under an Iranian choice-of-law clause.368 Contract ambiguities
might also subject Western investments to Iranian courts and principles of
the Shari'a.3 69 Though Iran's need for Western energy technology should
provide a significant deterrent against unfair treatment, a foreign choiceof-law clause will always present uncertainty.3 70 Under a foreign choiceof-law clause, parties will not be able to determine with certainty the likely
outcome of any future legal dispute.
Dispute Resolution Clause: Both the TOTAL SA and Bow VALLEY
contract synopses indicate that Western parties have sought to provide for
future dispute resolution through arbitration clauses.37 ' The arbitration
clauses in these contracts are lean. Disputes arising from these agreements
are to be resolved by a three-person arbitral tribunal to be decided upon by
the parties.37 2 While one can only speculate as to the lack of specific detail,
these clauses manifest Iran's partial willingness to accept a method of
dispute resolution similar to that used by the U.S.-Iran Claims Tribunal.37 3
364.
365.
366.
367.

See generally SMITH, supra note 304.
See BARROWS CONTRACT SYNOPSES, supra note 357.
See id.
See generally R.D. BISHOP, INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATIONOF PETROLEUM DISPUTES: THE
DEVELOPMENT OF A "LEX PETROLEA," Centre for Energy Petroleum and Mineral Law Policy,
Oxford (1997).
368. See BARROWS CONTRACT SYNOPSES, supra note 357.
369. See generally EL-MALIK, supra note 329.
370. See JACK J. COE, JR., INT'L COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 80-85 (1997) (discussing Lex
Mercatoria).
371. See BARROWS CONTRACT SYNOPSES, supra note 357.
372. See id.
373. See Newman, supra note 353, at 635.
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The brevity of these arbitration clauses does, however, create a good
bit of uncertainty. Important determinations such as situs of arbitration
(Lex Arbitri), conflicts issues (Lex Fori),procedural rules, and gap-filling,
(e.g., with principles of Lex Mercatoriaor UNIDROIT principles) are not
included.374 This uncertainty reduces the speed and efficiency in which a
contemporary Iranian investment dispute could be resolved.375 It also
raises questions of enforcement.376 These problems could be alleviated by
designating a particular administering institution (e.g., The International
Chamber of Commerce) and/or utilizing a standard institutional clause.377
In all likelihood, it is difficult to convince Iranian negotiators to agree
to anything other than a rudimentary arbitral clause. Unlike fellow Gulf
States (e.g., Bahrain) Iran's skepticism towards Western arbitral
institutions is evident in its failure to ratify major arbitral agreements such
as the U.N. Arbitration Convention of 1958, the Convention on the
Settlement of Investment Disputes of 1965, or the Convention on
Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency of 1985.378 Iran's failure to
ratify these conventions is unfortunate. It undermines Iran's claim of a
secure investment environment and precludes opportunities to cut potential
dispute resolution costs. Additionally, Iran's reluctance to sign arbitration
treaties inhibits the use of even more beneficial clauses (e.g., those
requiring mediation and negotiation prior to arbitration or those
incorporating a hybrid-approach). Not surprisingly these do not appear
under the TOTAL SA and Bow VALLEY agreements.3' 9 Major Western
corporations, therefore, appear to be sacrificing the certainty of model
clauses and arbitral institutions in an effort to avoid haggling with Iran
over dispute resolution issues.
Force Majeur and Termination Clauses: The TOTAL SA and Bow
agreements maintain termination and Force Majeur provisions.
The details of non-performance under these provisos are not available in
the Barrows Contract Synopses. Both contracts do, however, require
advance notice of cancellation.
Termination clauses may be particularly useful in the event of
sanctions enforcement. In situations where a party must back out of an
VALLEY

374. See COE, supra note 369, at 159-84 (discussing arbitral clauses and drafting
considerations).
375. See id.
376. See id.
377. See id.
378. See id.at 903 (displaying tabular information: "Scoreboard ofAdherence to Transnational
Arbitration Treaties").
379. See generally Christine Lecuyer-Thieffry & Patrick Thieffry, NegotiatingSettlement of
DisputesProvisionsin InternationalBusiness Contracts:Recent Developments in Arbitrationand
Other Processes,45 BUs. LAW 577 (1990).
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agreement already signed (e.g., Bow VALLEY'S partnership arrangements),
Western parties must consider how to incorporate sanctions risks into
Force Majeur clauses. Companies evaluating investment in a politically
unstable country are wise to monitor U.S. domestic policies when looking
towards contract drafting. A corporation such as Telephone Systems
International Inc., having recently sought investment in Afghanistan,380
may find that its newly-signed agreement is unexpectedly subjected to
domestic political regulations.38 ' In contracts such as that signed by
TOTAL, such unilateral sanctions may prevent adherence to a strict 90-day
contractual termination notice if assets or finances are suddenly frozen.382
Assignment Clauses: In addition to termination clauses, both the TOTAL
SA and the Bow VALLEY clauses have assignment clauses.383 These
clauses allow Western corporations to transfer their agreements to other
multi-national corporations upon favorable consent by NIOC to be decided
within 30 days. 384 As with the termination clauses, assignment clauses
should be considered as a possible means of protecting against sanctions
risk. A company threatened by sanctions enforcement could simply assign
its contractual obligations to a new party. The TOTAL SA contract even
provides that a failure of the NIOC to respond to an assignment request
within 30 days is to be considered tacit approval.385
Method of Payment Clauses: The TOTAL SA and Bow VALLEY
agreements, though centered on a specified rate of return on investment,
are in line with the similar method of compensation found in most modem
Production-Sharing Agreements (PSAs).' 6 These contracts call for
payment in specified amounts of natural gas or crude.387 Interestingly, the
TOTAL SA agreement utilizes a base market price in crude in order to

380. In contrast to Iranian sanctions regulations, Afghan sanctions are not extraterritorial. See
Pamela Constable, Afghanistan Opens Lines to the World; Phone System First Investment Since
'79, WASH. POST, May 8,1999, at Al 3 (reporting on Telephone Systems International Inc., aNew
Jersey-based investment group, and its recent $240 million joint venture with Afghanistan's
Communications Ministry); see also John Lancaster, Afghanistan Rulers Accused of Giving
TerroristRefuge; Clinton Bans Tradingwith Taliban Militia, WASH. POST, Jul. 7, 1999, at Al 5,
(reporting on recent sanctions on Iran; in contrast to Iranian sanctions Afghan sanctions are not
extraterritorial).
381. See id.
382. See BARROWS CONTRACT SYNOPSES, supra note 357.
383. See id.
384. See id.
385. See id.
386. See SMITH, supra note 304, at 334-49, 708-21 (discussing production sharing agreements
and counter-trade models in international energy transactions).
387. See BARROWS CONTRACT SYNOPSES, supra note 357.
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determine payment in natural gas.3"' Analysis of the payment formula
indicates that as the market price of crude declines, so does the
compensation price of the natural gas.38 9 TOTAL SA will, therefore, receive
more gas as crude prices drop and less gas as crude prices increase. This
appears to be the case regardless of the demand price for natural gas.3 90
Joint Management and Participation Clauses: Not surprisingly, Iran has
sought domestic content clauses that benefit development and training in
its energy sector.3 9' It appears, however, to have been more lenient in its
less-developed natural gas sector as opposed to the petroleum sector where
it has more experience.
The Bow VALLEY agreement is characterized as a contractor service
arrangement.392 Its terms restrain contractor independence by requiring
Iranian supervision over Bow VALLEY operations.393 Under this agreement
Bow VALLEY is required to give priority to qualified Iranian citizens,
equipment, and services.394 It is also required to contract with Iranian firms
for at least thirty percent of the Petroleum costs and must limit foreign
personnel to positions that can not be filled by qualified Iranian workers.3 95

Additionally, a joint management clause establishes a Joint Management
Committe (JMC) between Bow VALLEY and the NIOC that consists of six
representatives (three from each party) and requires unanimity in all joint
ventures.3 96

Comparatively, the TOTAL SA agreement is characterized as a buy-sell
arrangement,397 with TOTAL SA as the buyer and the NIOC as the seller.
As an incentive to development, Iran apparently sacrificed more control
over natural gas development in exchange for the buyer's installation of
necessary extraction, compression, and transportation facilities. 398 The
apparent flexibility granted to TOTAL SA in its operations as compared the
Bow VALLEY agreement might be attributed to the fact that the Bow
VALLEY agreement came two years into Iran's experience renegotiating
with Western corporations.3 99 Over the course of its negotiations, Iran

appears to have increased its bargaining power, lobbying for more of a role

388.
389.
390.
391.
392.

393.
394.
395.
396.
397.
398.
399.

See id.
See id.
See id.
See SMITH, supra note 304, at 349-63 (discussing domestic content clauses).
See BARROWS CONTRACT SYNOPSES, supra note 357.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id.
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in foreign investment operations. This increase in Iran's negotiation savvy
and stronger bargaining position is also evidenced in the fact that the Bow
VALLEY agreement, unlike the TOTAL SA contract, incorporates even more
novel provisions favoring Iran. 4 These provisions include a requirement
that development operations be conducted in accordance with good
industry practices and in an environmentally sensitive manner.4 ° '
Contract Summary: Analysis of the TOTAL SA and the Bow VALLEY
contracts indicate that Iran is attempting to maximize its returns and that
it is gaining experience dealing with modem Western contractual
clauses.40 2 Bow VALLEy, a smaller corporation and one likely to have less
bargaining power than a larger corporation such as TOTAL SA, appears to
have ceded more control over its operations. 3 Although both companies
bargained for clauses that account for the risks of expropriation, neither
contract provides optimal protection against foreign and domestic political
risk, particularly in the area of dispute resolution. A quantification of these
risks is therefore helpful in determining what clauses a corporation should
bargain for.
X. QUANTIFICATION OF POLITICAL RISK-FOREIGN AND DOMESTIC

"American sanctions are a concern, but Shell will seek a
waiver." '
Due to the political volatility of unilateral sanctions and their ability to
upset multi-million dollar contracts, corporations would benefit from any
attempt at quantifying the risks of unilateral sanctions enforcement.
Although investors have accounted for foreign political risk since the
earliest Iranian investment projects, no apparent methodology exists for
examining domestic political risk.4"'

400.
401.
402.
403.
404.

See id.
Seeid.
See id.
See id.
See SHELL Poised, supra note 201 (noting that SHELL has recently reached advanced

negotiations over Soroush and Nowruz oil development projects and quoting industry source in full:
"SHELL would go ahead with the Soroush and Nowruz project. American sanctions are aconcern,
but SHELL will seek a waiver. Besides, other companies have made deals in Iran, and SHELL
expects it would get the same treatment they did."). Despite having substantial assets subject to
U.S. jurisdiction, SHELL is "prepared to proceed" with its recent contract for development of the
Sorush and Nowruz oil fields. See SHELL to Invest in Iranian Oil, Risking US. Penalty, N.Y. TIMES,
Nov. 15, 1999, at CIO (quoting ROYAL DUTCH SHELL'S Country Chairman in Iran, Mr. Edi

Cartier).
405. Compare Anne Q. Connaughton, Factoring U.S. Export Controls and Sanctions Into
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Methods for anlyzing the potential risk of sanctions enforcement could
include analysis made on a percentage of risk-per-factor basis (e.g.,
chances of OFAC waiver in event of merger), or the incorporation of
domestic political risks into the evaluation of costs versus revenue (e.g.,
potential gains in Iranian market versus losses in U.S. market for sanctions
avoidance). °6 Other statistical approaches to the issue may be more
cumbersome than they are useful, but a basic understanding of the
domestic political risks along with foreign political factors is necessary to
planning for future entry into a sanctioned market.
Energy companies, such as SHELL, are already incorporating domestic
political risks indirectly into their strategies even if formal quantification
and analysis is not apparent in their business strategy or in scholarly
literature. With domestic merger trends on the rise in the energy-industry
(e.g., EXXON-MOBIL, 40 7 BRITISH PETROLEUM-AMOCO-ARCO, 4 °8 TOTALPETROFINA-ELF), 40 9 larger

corporations ("super-majors") including SHELL
are negating the risk of sanctions enforcement by playing various legal
systems against each other.4 10 Strategic MNC-partnerships have a similar
effect. They counter risk of sanctions by increasing opportunities for
OFAC waivers or sanctions work-arounds. Additionally, foreign
companies have reduced domestic political risks by selling off their
stateside assets and avoiding U.S. jurisdictional requirements.
In similar fashion, smaller corporations such as CONOCO and ARCO, are
able to work within the bounds of sanctions to reduce the effects of
domestic political risk. These companies are using calculated planning and
limited investment initiatives in order to gain exposure to the Iranian
market. These actions reduce the long-term costs of unilateral sanctions
while minimizing the chances of sanctions enforcement. Smaller
companies could calculate the cost versus benefit of these strategies by
quantifying the reduction in domestic political risks each option achieves.

InternationalTradeDecisions, 27 STETSONL. REv. 1211 (1998) (discussing general considerations
but not addressing quantification of domestic political risk), with TuGENDHADT, supra note 15, at
146.
406. Interview with Dan Littmann, Business and Management Consultant, in Chicago, Ill.,
(July 19, 1999).
407. EXXON and MOBIL are currently seeking merger. See Next: EXXON-MOBIL, OIL & GAS J.,
Jan. 11, 1999, at 31; see also Little Big Men, ECONOMIST, May 15, 1999, at 74 (presenting tabular
display of recent mergers).
408. In December 1998, BRITISH PETROLEUM and Amoco received approval for merger from
the U.S. Federal Trade Commission. See BP-AMoco Finish Merger after FTC Approval, OIL &
GAS J., Jan. 11, 1999, at 3 1.
409. TOTAL SA merged with PETROFINA in 1998. See TOTAL, PETROFINA, Revise Merger
Expectations, OIL & GAS J., Dec. 21, 1998, at 30.
410. See id.
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Although OFAC makes quantification of domestic political risks
difficult by not publicly releasing its waiver and license information, such
analysis is not outside the realm of corporate research. By quantifying the
overall risk of unilateral sanctions enforcement and the indirect costs on
future investment strategies, both attorneys and entrepreneurs can better
ascertain their bargaining position for initial contract negotiations. Such
analysis would be beneficial in the design of contractual clauses,
specifically those dealing with non-performance or dispute resolution.
Legal counsels must be wary, however, that their advice on mergers or
sanctions does not promote illegal activity. Quantification of political risks
appears proper when it does not advocate violations of trade regulations.
Yet, advice urging prohibited conduct would not only be illegal, but also
unethical in light of the Model Rules of Professional Conduct."'
Even if a company has difficulty obtaining accurate and comprehensive
statistical risk analysis on sanctions enforcement, it can still utilize a
simple review of domestic political conditions in a beneficial manner.
Basic analysis of domestic political risk can be used to determine whether
or not attempting entry into an unstable market is practical for a business.
Such a review can be used to calculate the possibilities of long-term or
short-term gains and the potential for contract disruption. Quantification
of domestic sanctions risks can ultimately aid in the evaluation of a
company's business choices. Since the unique nature of Iran's buy-back
contracts precludes formation of production sharing agreements (PSA),
larger firms may have less of an incentive to enter into limited investment
agreements.412 Alternatively, smaller companies, may find that the high

411. The Iranian Transactions Regulations, specifically provisions under3 1C.F.R. § 560.525,
leave much to be desired with regard to regulating a lawyer's conduct under sanctions. This
provision combined with professional ethics rules raises interesting ethical questions when
considering at what point merger advice becomes legally prohibited. It is clear that a lawyer is
proscribed from giving merger advice if such advice facilitates illegal activity. This issue becomes
complicated, however, when one considers the possibility of an American lawyer working in a
foreign branch office, either stateside or abroad, in a merged company. The ethical dilemma occurs
if he is requested to indirectly assist the controlling corporation in Iranian investment operations
or given a transfer into foreign operations. Since sanctions violations carry criminal and civil
penalties, assistance of such operations may be detrimental to a legal career. As to what extreme
this would be enforced by the bar or the courts is not known. Should a lawyer decline to take a
phone call from a client, or another office, if he knows that the individual he will be helping is
working on an Iranian investment? Or, should he decline an offer for a new position because it
involves handling Iranian transactions in a foreign office of a merged company? Compare 31
C.F.R. § 560.525 (prohibiting exportation of legal services to the Government of Iran or its entities,
and precluding representation and counseling that "facilitates transactions" that violate the
sanctions regulations), with MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rules 1.16, 8.4.
412. See Bigger,supranote 233 (discussing the advantages smaller companies have in moving
quickly into the smaller upstream opportunities available in the Middle East and quoting a chief
executive officer for a small-scale oil company: "Iam happy to see the merger, because the bigger
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rates of return on limited Iranian capital investments provide a consistent
stream of income without the risk of unproven reserves associated with a
typical PSA.413 With Iran still holding onto its most lucrative resources for
future development, 14 a formal evaluation of domestic political risks can
help determine the overall advantageous of specific market initiatives.
XI. CONCLUSION

"In this global economy, we will continue to witness the
perpetual movement of capital in search of efficient
allocation and higher profitability."4 5
In today's globalized energy market, the United States will continue to
find itself under intense pressure to lift unilateral sanctions in market areas
that are heavily saturated with major multi-national corporations. The U.S.
government's recent trade embargo against Afghanistan" 6 indicates,
however, that unilateral sanctions are going to be with us for quite some
time. As advocates of unilateral sanctions find it increasingly difficult to
defend their positions against the same market pressures that tore down the
Berlin Wall and dissolved Socialist based economies, Iranian officials will
be forced to continue evaluating the advantages of more liberal
development offers.4t 7 In light of these factors, unilateral sanctions
enforcement will become dependent more on political considerations than
legal determinations. This will be particularly true in high visibility crossborder cases.
This Article demonstrates that the risks of sanctions enforcement must
be factored into any Iranian investment decision. Formal quantification of
these risks may be a beneficial method of analyzing appropriate business
choices. It is evident that current corporate strategies are already reducing
the political risk of unilateral sanctions enforcement and are ultimately
undermining sanctions effectiveness. Although unilateral sanctions may
not be the primary reason for mergers or subsidiary sell-offs, they will be
a consideration in any long-range corporate business strategy. They

they are the easier it is for us."); see also Farivar, supra note 193.
413. See id.
414. See Tightrope, supra note 120 (noting that Iran has not offered investment opportunities
in its most lucrative onshore fields).
415. See Rhodes, supra note 198 (quoting Iranian Deputy Minister of Economic Affairs and
Finance).
416. See Lancaster, supra note 380.
417. See Thomas L. Friedman, Mideast Sanctions Proving Ineffective, Economic Forces Favor
Iraq, Iran, ARIZONA REPUBLIC, Oct. 28, 1997, at B5 (noting that powerful economic forces are
against sanctions).
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already appear to be a proven tactic for maintaining a competitive edge in
the Iranian market.
From a policy standpoint, this Article shows that unilateral prohibitions
in today's international market are nothing more than a political hot
potato. The United States government will ultimately have to rethink
foreign policy initiatives that run contrary to international consensus.418
With no support behind U.S.-Iranian sanctions, economic forces are
ultimately undermining the viability of their legal enforcement. Though
the judiciary may read sanctions provisions broadly, political pressures
decrease the chances of a sanctions case actually reaching the courts.
Instead, the U.S. government relies on private financial institutions to
execute an executive role in enforcing legal provisions.
In the end corporations will continue to look within legal boundaries
for a way to circumvent the effects of unilateral sanctions. Where the U.S.
economy does not have complete control over a market, corporate
initiatives will render unilateral sanctions politically difficult to enforce.
As is seen in the Iranian market, sanctions merely create investment
opportunities for foreign businesses, banks, and insurance institutions as
corporations avoid those institutions subject to U.S. jurisdiction. All things
considered, Alexis de Tocqueville might look down at the Iran's grassroots
reform movement with a smile, but he is more apt to raise a quizzical
eyebrow at the inconsistency and intransigence found in American
sanctions policies." 9

418. See generally ROGER FISHER, et al., BEYOND MACHIAVELLI 4 (1994) (advocating fresh
thinking in international conflict resolution).
419. As of the August, 1999, the U.S. Government has not issued an enforcement decision on
Bow VALLEY, ELF, and TOTAL. Inconsistencies in its policy towards Iran continue to arise on a
recurring basis. Compare Alan George, US. Exports Conflict with Iran Embargo, MIDDLE EAST,
July 1, 1995 (discussing Senate report on export of nuclear equipment to Iran), with Meanwhile
There's Iran, ECONOMIST, June 27, 1998, at 27 (describing President Clinton's veto on legislation
designed to impose sanctions on suppliers of missile technology to Iran), andA Very Crude Form
of Politics: The Future Shape of the Oil Industry Is Being Determined as much by American
ForeignPolicy as by Free Competition, ECONOMIST 64, May 6, 1995.
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